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The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, Fifty
Years Later

JACK M. BEERMANN*

Seldom, if ever, have the power and the purposes of legislation
been renderedso impotent.... All that is left today are afew scattered remnants of a once grandiosescheme to nationalize thefundamental rights of the individual.'
These words were written fifty years ago by Eugene Gressman, now
William Rand Kenan, Jr. Professor Emeritus, University of North Carolina
School of Law, as a description of what the courts, primarily the Supreme
Court of the United States, had done with the civil rights legislation passed
by Congress in the wake of the Civil War. Professor Gressman's article,
The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,2 provides a detailed and
comprehensive picture of the mischief wrought by the Supreme Court in
the civil rights area, beginning with decisions dating to the Reconstruction
Era, when slavery and the Civil War that ended it were still recent events.
Professor Gressman could not have known in 1952 that he was writing
just before the dawn of what has been called the Second Reconstruction,
when a civil rights movement would grip the country, resulting in numerous new civil rights statutes and many Supreme Court rulings favorable to
the enforcement of civil rights, including racial equality. Racial injustice,
discrimination and prejudice remain high on the social and political agenda
fifty years after Professor Gressman's observations-despite the civil
rights movement, the enactment of numerous civil rights statutes (including
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965), and the
Professor of Law and Richard L. Godfrey Faculty Research Scholar, Boston University School
of Law. Thanks to Larry Yackle, Bill Marshall, Ward Farnsworth, Ron Cass, Gary Lawson, Jay Wexler and the participants in faculty workshops at University ofNorth Carolina Chapel Hill School of Law
and Boston University School of Law for comments on an earlier draft. Special thanks to Eugene
Gressman both for his original paper that inspired this one and for taking the time to discuss an earlier
draft of this paper.
I Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323,
1323, 21343 (1952).
id.
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reinvigoration of many important provisions of the civil rights statutes of
the 1860s and 1870s. Ongoing controversies include racial issues such as
affirmative action, racial profiling and environmental racism, and other
non-racial questions concerning the rights of women, the disabled, homosexuals and religious minorities, among others.
In this Article, I address the last fifty years of the Supreme Court's
treatment of civil rights legislation. I do not address broad normative questions of racial and social justice, but rather look, as did Professor Gressman, at the treatment of civil rights legislation by the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court of the United States.
The question up for discussion is whether the civil rights revolution of
the last fifty years renders what Professor Gressman said was either an
artifact of legal history or perhaps an inspiration for what followed. My
examination of decisions on the construction and scope of civil rights statutes over the last fifty years reveals a mixed record of Supreme Court decisions, some advancing civil rights and others hindering them. Some decisions employ much the same reasoning and methods of construction to
civil rights legislation today as the Court did in the period from the Civil
War to 1952 when Professor Gressman was writing. What Professor
Gressman bemoaned as "strict constructionism" and "unreal, mechanistic
interpretations" that rendered much of Congress's Reconstruction-Era
handiwork for naught, lives on in much of the Court's treatment of the legislation that emerged from both the First and Second Reconstructions.
However, the Court has interpreted some provisions quite broadly, recognizing claims that might have led even members of the Reconstruction-Era
Congress to conclude that the Court was being too friendly to civil rights
plaintiffs, not only embracing Congress's aims but advancing civil rights
even beyond what the statutory language suggests. In evaluating the
Court's performance with regard to civil rights legislation, it is important to
add to the mix the Court's expansion of constitutional rights in the past
fifty years. Because some civil rights statutes provide mechanisms for
enforcing constitutional rights, when the Court recognizes a new constitutional right, or broadens an existing one, the reach of civil rights statutes
inevitably also expands. Our society has made great progress on civil
rights since 1952. However, we could have done better, and while the
Court has been a positive influence in some areas, the Court's resistance
has limited progress in others.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I contains a reminder of how
things were in 1952 when Professor Gressman wrote, a detailed look at the
constitutional and statutory situation at the time Professor Gressman wrote,
and my update of Professor Gressman's analysis of Supreme Court treatment of Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes. In this Part, I conclude
first that the Court, since 1952, has interpreted key statutory provisions,
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mainly 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1982 very broadly, perhaps more broadly
than the Reconstruction-Era Congresses anticipated; second that the record
with regard to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is mixed, with the Court's expansive constitutional interpretations accounting for an explosion in § 1983 litigation;
and third that not much has changed since Professor Gressman wrote with
regard to 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3). Part II analyzes the Supreme Court's treatment of more recent civil rights legislation, beginning with the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 and including more recent enactments such as the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act. This
Part includes a look at the changing constitutional landscape as it relates to
Congress's power to legislate in the civil rights area, including the Court's
recent invocation of severe limitations on Congress's power to legislate
under the Reconstruction-Era amendments. Part III summarizes my conclusions.
I. RECONSTRUCTION-ERA CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION: THEN AND Now

A.

The Civil Rights Landscapeas ProfessorGressman Saw It

Professor Gressman began his article by sketching both the conditions
in the South that provoked Congress to act to protect civil rights and the
remedies that Congress chose. Professor Gressman's clear treatment of the
social and legal history makes it unnecessary for me to repeat that material,
but as a prelude, it is important to draw out a few important themes.
The Reconstruction-Era Congress produced three constitutional
amendments and five civil rights statutes during the period 1865 through
1875. Some of the purposes of the constitutional amendments are apparent
from their language: the Thirteenth Amendment was designed to abolish
slavery, the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to overrule the Dred
Scott3 decision by granting citizenship to Blacks and the Fifteenth Amendment was designed to eliminate racial restrictions in voting. There are,
however, many open questions regarding the reach of the constitutional
amendments, particularly the Thirteenth and Fourteenth.
As Professor Gressman pointed out, the opponents of the Thirteenth
Amendment strongly objected to the amendment on the ground that it
"guaranteed the emancipated Negro certain minimum rights, and that Congress would be enabled to safeguard and protect those rights by legislation."4 This was viewed as inconsistent with federalism principles under
which states were the guardians of individual rights. According to Gressman, the rights thought to be established by the Thirteenth Amendment
3Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1856).
4 Gressman, supranote 1,'at
1324.
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included "equality before the law, protection in life and person, and free
opportunity to live, work and move about."5 Thus, while on a narrow view
the Thirteenth Amendment did nothing more than abolish slavery, the
broad view held that implicit in the abolition of slavery was a charter of
equal rights and personal freedom and security for the freed slaves.
The reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, beyond the grant of citizenship to the freed slaves and other Blacks and racial minorities, is murkier
than the reach of the Thirteenth. It is a familiar piece of constitutional lore
that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed because of Congress's lingering doubts about the constitutionality of the Civil Rights Act of 1866. The
amendment was undoubtedly designed to grant Congress the power to legislate on the broad view of the reach of the Thirteenth Amendment, i.e., to
go beyond slavery into the realm of equal rights and equal protection. The
amendment was designed to support legislation that had been or would be
passed granting Blacks equal rights to own property, to make and enforce
contracts, to be parties and witnesses in legal proceedings and other basic
civil rights.' Beyond that, substantial uncertainty exists concerning the
reach of the broad prohibition of state denials of privileges or immunities,7
due process and equal protection.
In passing the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress had before it a great
deal of evidence of private resistance to equal rights for Blacks in the form
of terror and violence perpetrated by various people and groups, including
the Ku Klux Klan and the unwillingness or inability of state and local governments to do anything about it. Professor Gressman opined that despite
the Fourteenth Amendment's language that appears as a set of prohibitions
directed at states, Congress meant for the amendment to grant it the power
to attack private action, as well as state action, that prevented Blacks from
fully enjoying the benefits of their freedom. Professor Gressman thus
laments the Supreme Court's extremely narrow reading of the Privileges or
Immunities Clause and its creation of the state action doctrine, each of
which severely curtailed the possible reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Professor Gressman attributes the amendment's phrasing to Congress's
5 Id. at 1325 (citing JACOBUS TEN BROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT 14243 (1951)).

6 It was unclear whether Congress had the power, under the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amend-

ments, to legislate voting rights for Blacks. This uncertainty was resolved by the ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment in 1870, prohibiting the denial of the right to vote based on "race, color or previous condition of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV.
7 Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution refers to the "Privileges and Immunities" of state citizens while Fourteenth Amendment protects the "Privileges or Immunities" of citizens of the United
States from state infringement. U.S. CONST. amend XIV, §1 (emphasis added).
8"It was private action, not state action, that had been the prime motivation for all the toil and debates that produced the Fourteenth Amendment and the surrounding legislation." Gressman, supra
note I, at 1340.
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"fail[ure] to anticipate the judicial process of interpretation with its ever
present possibility of strict constructionism."9 Civil rights legislation and
constitutional amendments were new territory for Congress and, although it
recognized that it was asserting federal power over an area previously left
to the states, it was sensitive to the federalism issues involved. Its drafting
was far from perfect, but the Supreme Court could have been more generous in construing the amendments and statutes to accomplish the expansion
of civil rights.
The statutes that Congress passed during this period reflected the problems that existed regarding the situation of Blacks, mainly in the South.
Congress passed civil rights statutes in 1866, 1870, 1871 and 1875, and, as
Professor Gressman detailed, the Supreme Court either read the important
provisions of these laws very narrowly or held them unconstitutional, thus
dismantling many of the legal aspects of Reconstruction. The state action
doctrine was the most important tool used by the Court to dismantle Congress's civil rights legislation. By requiring state action, the Court denied
to Congress the power to legislate against many of the problems that
Blacks faced at the time, including Ku Klux Klan violence' ° and the denial
of equal rights to use facilities such as inns, theaters and other places of
public accommodation." Professor Gressman characterized the Court's
actions as a "Judicial Coup d'Etat."' 2
B.

The ConstitutionalBackground of Civil Rights Legislation

The first Supreme Court decision that Professor Gressman characterizes as relevant to the reach of the Civil War-Era civil rights statutes is the
Slaughterhouse Cases.3 In that decision, which has probably been described thousands of times in the commentary and case law, the Supreme
Court upheld a Louisiana statute granting to a single corporation a monopoly over the business of slaughtering animals in the state. 4 The Court read
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as protecting only a narrow set of rights associated with national citizenship, and
determined it did not significantly touch the relationship of citizen and
9

Id.

10 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629,637-42 (1882).
1"The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 24-25 (1883).
12 Gressman, supra note I, at 1336. It should be noted that Professor Gressman implicates Con-

gress in the process of dismantling the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes in two ways. First, the
statutes were damaged in the recodification process in 1873 in which "the civil rights statutes were
separated under unrelated chapters of [the] Revised Statutes and thus lost their distinctive, coherent
character." Id. at 1343. Second, "in 1894, when the Democrats first won the presidency and both
houses of Congress, most of the provisions protecting suffrage were repealed." Id.
13 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
14 Id. at 57, 60, 83.
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state or encroach significantly on the states' police powers. As Professor
Gressman described it, the Court "[c]ompletely shattered . . . the
[P]rivileges and [I]mmunities [C]lause upon which rested the intricate pattern of nationally protected civil rights."' 5
While the Privileges or Immunities clause has not been revived,' 6 Professor Gressman's statement that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment to this day
has never recovered its life blood which the Court there extracted from it"
is no longer accurate. In the fifty years since Professor Gressman wrote,
the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment have picked up much of the slack left by the Court's narrow reading
of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.
The most obvious example in this regard is the application of the Bill
of Rights to the states. Professor Gressman bemoaned the fact that the
Court had held that the Privileges or Immunities Clause did not result in
the application of the Bill of Rights to the states. 7 While it is still true that
the Bill of Rights does not apply in its entirety to the states, the Court has
held that most of the rights enumerated in the first eight amendments to the
Constitution apply against the states through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' This greatly expands the potential reach of civil
rights legislation, since practices such as cruel and unusual punishment and
unreasonable searches and seizures, among others, are now constitutionally
prohibited against state, as well as federal, action.
Another constitutional limitation on Congress's power to legislate civil
rights is the state action doctrine. As Professor Gressman noted, the state
action doctrine arose in 1876, when the Court held that the Fourteenth
Amendment did not "'add anything to the rights which one citizen has under the Constitution against another.""' 9 The state action doctrine was and
still is a fundamental limitation on the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Professor Gressman pointed out that the majority in Congress believed,
or at least acted as if it believed, that the Fourteenth Amendment granted it
the power to legislate against the private action that, according to Professor
Gressman, had been the "prime motivation" behind the Fourteenth
Amendment." Professor Gressman acknowledged that the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment suggests the state action limitation, and he laisGressman, supra note

1, at 1338.
16 The Supreme Court has read the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to protect the right of a citizen of one of the United States to establish residence in and thereby
become a citizen of another state, thus entitling the new citizen to all of the rights enjoyed by other
citizens of the state. See Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 503 (1999).
17 See Gressman, supranote I, at 1338-39 (citing Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908)).
18
See generallyGEOFFREY R. STONE ET. AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 702-09 (4th ed. 2001).
19Gressman, supra note I, at 1339 (quoting United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1876)).
20 Id. at 1330, 1340.
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mented that "the [F]ramers had assumed too much and incorporated too
little when they drafted the amendment."'"
A great deal of the importance of the state action limitation lies in its
interaction with Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, which grants
Congress the power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment "by appropriate
legislation." The Court has historically demanded a close connection between legislation pursuant to Section 5 and actual violations of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Professor Gressman phrased it, "[t]he fifth section
of the amendment, designed to be the deep well of needed legislative protection of basic civil rights, was held to give Congress nothing more than
the power 'to adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects' of the
state laws and actions prohibited in the first section." 2 Based on this understanding, if Congress relies on Section 5 to legislate against purely private conduct, the Court will hold the legislation unconstitutional as beyond
Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.
The best example of this reasoning lies in the Civil Rights Cases,' the
1883 decision striking down the Civil Rights Act of 1875 on the ground
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment did not give Congress the
power to legislate against private discrimination. The Court was clear that
its view of the nature of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment precludes legislation directed at relations among private individuals. The Court explained that Section 5 is not a grant of plenary power
but rather a grant of power tied inextricably to the substance of the Fourteenth Amendment, which addresses only state action. The Court contrasted this power with other powers "in which Congress is clothed with
direct and plenary powers of legislation... [in which] Congress has power
to pass laws for regulating'the subjects specified in every detail, and the
'
conduct and transactions of individuals in respect thereof."24
Professor
Gressman characterized this case as "[t]he high point in the judicial negation of the abolitionists' labors"25 and the case is still cited favorably by the
current Court when it reads Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment narrowly.26
A similar issue of congressional power applies to the Thirteenth
Amendment. Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment grants Congress the
power to "enforce this article by appropriate legislation." In the early
cases, most notably once again the Civil Rights Cases, the Court limited
21 Id. at 1340.
22 Id. at 1341.
23 109 U.S. 3 (1883).

24 Id. at 18.
25 Gressman, supra note 1, at 1340.
26 See City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,524 (1997).
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congressional power to legislation that remedies conditions that violate the
Thirteenth Amendment or at least impede the accomplishment of its basic
purpose of abolishing slavery. The Court adopted a non-deferential attitude toward congressional power under the Reconstruction-Era amendments. In rejecting the claim that private discrimination in public accommodations was a "badge or incident" of slavery against which Congress
had the power to legislate, the Court employed its own definition of slavery
and stated that:
It would be running the slavery argument into the ground to make
it apply to every act of discrimination which a person may see fit
to make as to the guests he will entertain, or as to the people he
will take into his coach or cab or car, or admit to his concert or
theatre, or deal with in other matters of intercourse or business."
The Court's standards, as they existed at the time Professor Gressman
wrote, for evaluating whether legislation is properly founded upon Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments did
not allow Congress to legislate much beyond the terms of the amendments
themselves. The Fourteenth Amendment could not be used to regulate
relations among private individuals, and the Thirteenth Amendment would
not support legislation going much beyond slavery and the legal disabilities
entailed in that status.
C. Civil War-EraCivil Rights Legislation: Then and Now
In this Part, I look at the major surviving non-criminal civil rights provisions that date from the Reconstruction Era to evaluate whether Professor
Gressman's assessment still holds true. I look at four provisions currently
codified in Title 42 of the United States Code, §§1981, 1982, 1983 and
1985(3). In each case, I look at how the statute had fared up to the time
Professor Gressman wrote and how it fares today. Given the civil rights
revolution that occurred in the years since Professor Gressman wrote, it
should come as no surprise that things are much more favorable for civil
rights today than they were in 1952, although vestiges of the Court's pre1952 treatment of civil rights legislation survive.
Since 1952, when Professor Gressman wrote, there has been an explosion in civil rights litigation and legislation. There is so much civil rights
litigation in the federal courts that Supreme Court justices have repeatedly
referred to the flood of litigation to justify imposing limitations on the
reach of civil rights statutes, and Congress has acted more than once to
limit the ability of prisoners to bring civil rights litigation to challenge their

27 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 24-25.
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conditions of confinement.2"
Despite the explosion in civil rights litigation, the Supreme Court's
treatment of the Reconstruction-Era statutes constitutes a mixed bag of
very generous applications and very narrow interpretations and applications, what Professor Gressman called "strict constructionism."' 9 Because
many civil rights statutes involve enforcing constitutional rights, the expansion of civil rights litigation was inevitable, almost mechanical, in light
of the tremendous expansion of constitutional rights that has occurred in
the last fifty years. Additionally, it is likely that the interpretation of civil
rights statutes has been influenced by developments in constitutional law
since they have concepts in common, such as equality.
There are many people who would answer affirmatively if asked
whether Professor Gressman's use of the word "unhappy" to describe the
history of civil rights legislation in the United States is still an accurate
description. In fact, this assessment would come from both sides of the
political spectrum. From the left, the Supreme Court is likely to be viewed
as having unduly limited the scope of civil rights statutes, both from the
Reconstruction Era and from more recent times. From the right, the Supreme Court is viewed, over the past fifty years, as having unduly expanded both the scope of constitutional rights and the reach of civil rights
statutes of civil war and more recent vintage.
The observation that the Supreme Court's record on civil rights would
be attacked from both sides of the political spectrum leads to serious questions regarding the proper baseline for analyzing the Court's post-1952
record on civil rights legislation. Professor Gressman's apparent baseline
included the purposes behind and perhaps the plain meaning of the statutes
Congress passed in the 1860s and 1870s. I have less confidence in my
ability to discern those purposes and construe one-hundred and forty-yearold statutes with precision. I feel more confident in relying on two normative commitments, first to civil rights enforcement and second to fidelity to
the Court's best judgment about what Congress intended when it passed
the civil rights statutes, even if that judgment is unlikely to be very precise.
Several baseline problems remain, the most obvious of which is how "civil
rights enforcement" is defined, because it would not be useful to applaud
every case in which a plaintiff claiming a civil right prevails and condemn
every case in which a plaintiff claiming a civil right loses. Further, it
would be inappropriate to view the Court's treatment of ReconstructionEra civil rights statutes in isolation from surrounding issues, especially the
28 See The Prison Litigation Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3601 (2000); Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7, 94 Stat. 349 (1980) (codified in scattered sections of 42

U.S.C.).

29 Gressman, supranote 1, at 1340.
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Court's elaboration of constitutional rights. Most notably with regard to §
1983, which mainly enforces the Constitution against state and local officials, the Court's constitutional rulings may have had greater effect than its
statutory ones. Despite these difficulties, in what follows, I make my best
effort to present a picture updating what Professor Gressman found fifty
years ago regarding the Court's treatment of civil rights legislation.
1. Section 1982
All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every
State and Territory, as is enjoyed by [W]hite persons to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and personal property."
Section 1982 was derived from section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, which Congress reenacted in 1870 after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment. I treat it before § 1981 because its current construction
was arrived at first and provided the basis for the current construction of §
1981.
Section 1982 is phrased as a broad declaration of equal property rights.
When Professor Gressman wrote, the Court had clearly and firmly stated
that § 1982, then known as Revised Statutes section 1978, did not reach
private discrimination in property transactions." The background of the
Court's decision is important to understanding its holding.
In 1921, thirty White property owners in the District of Columbia executed and recorded an indenture agreeing that:
[N]o part of [their] properties should ever be used or occupied by,
or sold, leased or ,given to, any person of the negro race or blood;
and that this covenant should run with the land and bind their respective heirs and assigns for twenty-one years from and after its
date.32
In 1922, Irene Corrigan, a White owner of a home subject to the covenant, made a contract to sell the home to Helen Curtis, a Black person.
John Buckley sued in a D.C. court to enjoin the sale.33 The defendants
moved to dismiss the bill, arguing that enforcing the covenant would
violate various provisions of the U.S. Constitution and statutes passed

30 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994).
31 Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330-31 (1926). The Court had also held that the Thirteenth
Amendment did not give Congress the power to criminalize private racially motivated violence aimed
at preventing Blacks from enjoying the right to private employment. See Hodges v. United States, 203
U.S. 1, 16, 18-19 (1905), overruled by Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 441 n.78 (1968).
32 Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 327.
33 Id.
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under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments, including § 1982." 4
The D.C. court issued the injunction, and after it was affirmed on appeal, Corrigan and Curtis appealed to the Supreme Court of the United
States. In that Court, Corrigan and Curtis were represented by, inter alia,
Moorfield Story, "a prominent Boston lawyer who did legal work for the
'
NAACP before it had its own legal staff."35
Corrigan and Curtis continued
to argue that the restrictive covenants violated the Constitution and various
statutes, but the Supreme Court unanimously found those arguments so
insubstantial that it dismissed the appeal, stating that "in the absence of any
substantial constitutional or statutory question giving us jurisdiction of this
appeal under the provisions of section 250 of the Judicial Code, we cannot
determine upon the36merits the contentions earnestly pressed by the defendants in this court.
The Court did specifically address the statutory arguments against the
covenants. The Court stated:
The claim that the defendants drew in question the "construction"
of §§ [1981, 1982 and 1983], is equally unsubstantial, . . . [I]t is
obvious, upon their face, that while they provide, inter alia, that all
persons and citizens shall have equal right with [W]hite citizens to
make contracts and acquire property, they, like the Constitutional
Amendment under whose sanction they were enacted, do not in
any mannerprohibitor invalidate contracts entered into by private
individuals in respect to the control and disposition of their own
property.37
This decision was a major setback to the NAACP's efforts to attack
segregation,38 and it rendered § 1982 useless in the fight against private
racial discrimination in property transactions and ownership.
The Supreme Court's attitude toward private discrimination in property
transactions began to change shortly before Professor Gressman wrote. In
1948, in the landmark case Shelley v. Kraemer,39 the Court held that judicial enforcement of restrictive covenants, like the one at issue in Corrigan,
was state action that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Shelley's analytic structure may be troubling to those who
think that it transforms every situation in which a private citizen requests
government aid into state action subject to constitutional scrutiny, but Shel34 Id. at 328.
35 MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME

COURT, 1936-1961 84 (1994).
36 Corrigan, 271 U.S. at 332.
37 Id. at 330-31 (emphasis added).
38
See TUSHNET, supra note 35, at 85-86.
39 334 U.S. 1,22 (1948).
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ley's normative foundation-that state agents should not enforce racial
restrictions on property ownership--appears to be widely accepted.
Strikingly, just twenty-two years before Shelley, the Court unanimously
held that an appeal from an injunction enforcing such a covenant did not
even present a substantial federal question upon which to base Supreme
Court jurisdiction.
In hindsight, Shelley v. Kraemer can be viewed as the dawn of the Second Reconstruction's attack on segregation and other forms of racial injustice. Professor Gressman cited Shelley only for its reaffirmation of the
state action doctrine, because his focus was on civil rights legislation and
he did not delve deeply into the surrounding constitutional issues except as
necessary to explain statutory issues.4" Given the inhospitable attitude the
Supreme Court had previously shown to civil rights statutes and civil rights
claims generally, Shelley was viewed among civil rights advocates at the
time as important and positive.4'
Twenty years after Shelley, the Supreme Court finally had the opportunity to reconsider whether § 1982 prohibited racial discrimination in private property transactions, and it answered with a resounding "yes." In
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,42 the Court held the that Alfred H. Mayer
Company violated § 1982 when it refused to sell Jones a home "for the sole
reason that petitioner Joseph Lee Jones is a Negro."43
The Court's construction of § 1982 to reach private discrimination is
strongly supportive of the antidiscrimination goals of the ReconstructionEra Congress when it is viewed in light of the language of § 1982 and the
pre-existing case law that appears to hold that § 1982 reaches only state
action. The use of the word "right" in § 1982 strongly implies that the
statute is concerned with legal rights, not with private acts that might prevent Blacks from owning property in certain locations. The Court had two
somewhat inconsistent answers to this argument. First, the Court simply
concluded that the "right" to own property is impaired both by government
discrimination and by a private refusal to sell based on race.' This argument treats the word "right" not in its usual legal sense, but more politi40 See Gressman, supra note 1,at 1339 n.45. Professor Gressman, in a conversation in September
2001, explained to me that he was asked by the Michigan Law Review to write about civil rights legislation, and did not view it as part of his assignment to engage in an extended discussion of the correctness or importance of Shelley since Shelley was a constitutional decision.
41 See TusHNET, supranote 35, at 96-98.
42 392 U.S. 409,413 (1968).
43 Id.

44See id. at 421 (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 379 F.2d 33, 43 (1967)) ("[E]ven
if the
State and its agents lend no support to those who wish to exclude persons from their communities on
racial grounds, the fact remains that, whenever property 'is placed on the market for [W]hites only,
[W]hites have a right denied to Negroes."').
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cally, as when a disadvantaged segment of the community fights for its
rights.4" Second, the Court explained that the framers of § 1982 were concerned not only with discrimination by law, but also discrimination through
local "custom or prejudice."
In light of this concern, the "right" to nondiscriminatory property ownership could be infringed by private individuals and entities operating pursuant to local customs.47
Case law also stood as an obstacle to the Court's interpretation of §
1982 to reach private conduct. Specifically, as noted above, the Corrigan
case had decided that § 1982 did not reach private conduct. That view had
been stated by the Court much earlier as dicta"' and was repeated in a decision rendered after Corrigan,in the same year that the Court decided Shelley v. Kraemer.49
Rather than overrule Corrigan,the Court unsuccessfully attempted to
distinguish it on two bases. First, after stating that the Court in Corrigan
had held only that § 1982 did not prohibit private individuals from entering
into racially restrictive covenants, the Court said that it had not decided in
Corriganwhether those covenants were legally enforceable. Second, the
Jones Court stated that it had not decided whether, even if such covenants
were not illegal, individuals were still free to refuse to sell their property on
racial grounds. These distinctions do not seem to make much sense. On
the first distinction, recall that Corriganwas an appeal from an injunction
enforcing a restrictive covenant. The Corrigan Court held that enforcement of the restrictive covenant in that case did not present a sufficient
federal question to create Supreme Court jurisdiction over the appeal. That
seems like a pretty clear decision that federal law presents no obstacle to
enforcing such covenants. On the second distinction, the Jones Court
stated "[e]ven if Corrigan should be regarded as an adjudication that 42
U.S.C. § 1982... does not prohibit private individuals from agreeingnot
to sell their property to Negroes, Corrigan would not settle the question
whether § 1982 prohibits an actual refusal to sell to a Negro."5' This distinction fails for the same reason as the first-the Court in Corriganmust
have thought that an actual refusal to sell to a Black did not violate § 1982
since it, in effect, affirmed an order enforcing an injunction preventing a
White from selling to a Black. It would turn the law on its head to hold
45 See Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REV.

387, 390-401 (1984) (discussing various understandings of "rights").
46 Jones, 392 U.S. at 423.
47 The legislative history and the criminal counterparts to § 1982 also supported the Court's decision in Jones.
49 See Jones,392 U.S. at 420 n.25 (citing The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,11, 17 (1883); Virginia v.
Rives, 100 U.S. 313,318 (1880)).
49
See Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24,31 (1948).
50
aJones, 392 U.S. at 420 n.25.

CONNECTICUTLA W REVIEW

[Vol. 34:981

that a court order prohibiting a sale to a Black is legal while an individual
decision not to sell to a Black, with or without a restrictive covenant in the
background, is not.
The point of this detailed critique of the Court's opinion in Jones is not
to express disagreement with the outcome or even with the Court's reading
of § 1982. Rather, it is designed to illustrate two points. First, this decision is a strong counterexample to the Court's treatment of civil rights legislation up to the time Professor Gressman wrote. Not only did the Court
apply a Reconstruction-Era statute broadly, it did so when good arguments
based on traditional legal materials pointed in the opposite direction. Second, it illustrates that the judicial method need not differ depending on the
political direction in which the Court is headed. Just as conservative courts
may distort text, history and case law when limiting civil rights, liberal
courts do the same when expanding them.
The Court in Jones also made a crucial point concerning the constitutional underpinnings of § 1982 when it recognized substantially broader
power in Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment than the Court
had previously been willing to recognize. Here again, Professor Gressman's unhappy history becomes much happier. Once the Court decided
that § 1982 reached private conduct, the Court had to decide whether Congress had constitutional power to so provide. Under case law described
above, dating back to 1883,51 the answer would pretty clearly be no. The
Fourteenth Amendment would not support a statute directed at private discrimination and Congress's power to eradicate the "badges and incidents"
of slavery would reach only to legal disabilities on the right to own property and not to private refusals to sell property based on race.
In Jones, the Court adopted a deferential stance toward congressional
power under the Reconstruction-Era amendments. The Court stated:
"Surely Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine what are the badges and the incidents of slavery, and the
authority to translate that determination into effective legislation. Nor can
'
we say that the determination Congress has made is an irrational one."52
Later in its opinion, the Court quoted approvingly from a Member of Congress's invocation of McCulloch v. Maryland" in support of Congress's
power to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1866, implying that Congress's
power to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment is as broad, and worthy of
judicial deference, as its power to enforce the provisions of Article I of the
Constitution under the Necessary and Proper Clause. This represents a
51The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 11; United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629,639 (1882).
52

Jones, 392 U.S. at 440-41.

5317 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819), quoted in Jones, 392 U.S. at 443.
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radical break from prior law.'
After Jones, the Court also liberally construed § 1982 to apply to situations that were not obviously within its purview. In a pair of cases, the
Court held that privately owned neighborhood recreational facilities violated § 1982 when they discriminated against Blacks in their membership
policies. The membership policies were related to property interests, according to the Court, because membership was, in one case, granted automatically to Whites based on residence in the neighborhood5 5 and in the
other case was strongly tied to ownership of a home in the neighborhood.5 6
In both cases, the Court rejected arguments that § 1982 did not apply to the
membership decisions of private clubs, on the basis that membership was
intimately related to owning or leasing real property in the neighborhood.
The Court's willingness to apply § 1982 expansively has not been
without limits. The Court denied a § 1982 challenge to the City of Memphis's decision to close a street that connected a Black neighborhood with a
White neighborhood, holding that the street closing did not impair the
plaintiffs' property interests." The residents of the Black neighborhood
viewed the city's action as conferring a benefit to White property owners at
the expense of Black property owners whose property values would decline
and who would have to drive around, rather than through, the White
neighborhood. The Court rejected these claims on the grounds that there
was no evidence that similarly situated Black property owners would be
treated different than White owners in this case, there was no evidence that
Blacks' property values were threatened and Blacks were not actually disadvantaged in the use of their property. Implicitly, had the Court found
one of the three conditions previously stated present, it might have taken a
different view of the case. It seems likely that the Court's decision in this
case was influenced by some measure of reluctance to become entangled,
via § 1982, in potentially numerous challenges to municipal traffic, zoning
and other similar matters.
Without expressing an opinion on whether the Court's decisions are
correct or could have gone further, it is safe to say that Professor Gressman's criticisms of the Supreme Court's construction and application of
civil rights legislation no longer hold true with regard to § 1982. The
Court has construed § 1982 generously to attack racial discrimination related to a broad spectrum of property transactions and ownership.
54 The Court's attitude today is probably closer to the law as it stood before Jones. In City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511, 536 (1997), the Court applied a stricter standard to determine
whether Congress had the power to pass the Religious Freedom Restoration Act.
55 Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park, Inc., 396 U.S. 229,236 (1969).
56 Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410 U.S. 431,436 (1973).
57 City of Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 123 (1981).
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Section 1981

All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by [W]hite citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.5"
Section 1981, like § 1982, is derived from both the Civil Rights Act of
1866 and the Civil Rights Act of 1870, also known as the Enforcement
Act.59 At the time Professor Gressman wrote, § 1981 was probably also
understood not to reach private discrimination. Again, the main authority
for this is Corrigan v. Buckley, which held that a racially restrictive covenant agreed to by a group of White landowners did not violate §§ 1981,
1982, or 1983.60 Also, in 1906, the Court confirmed that Congress lacked
the power to criminalize private violations of § 1981, and the Court's language indicated that its reasoning would apply to civil applications of §
1981 as well.61 It does not appear that any other Supreme Court decision
before 1952 focused on the question whether private discrimination in the
making or enforcement of contracts is actionable under § 1981. It is only
speculation, but I assume that the reason for this absence of authority is
that no one imagined that such a claim would be successful.
Since Professor Gressman wrote, the Court's understanding and application of § 1981 has become very generous, much the same as its treatment
of § 1982. In fact, the Court's construction and application of § 1981 has
been tied to its understanding of § 1982. In 1968, in the midst of the Second Reconstruction, the Court's attitude toward § 1981 changed remarkably. In Runyon v. McRary,62 the Court held that § 1981 prohibits private
racial discrimination in the making of contracts, and that as so understood
the statute is a valid exercise of Congress's power to enforce the Thirteenth
Amendment.63 The Court relied heavily on its previous decision that §
1982 reaches private discrimination in property transactions, and held that
"a Negro's ...right to 'make and enforce contracts' is violated if a private
58 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1994).
59 See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 168 n.8 (1976). See Gressman, supra note I, at 1326
(listing the right to buy, sell and own realty and personal property, the right to sue, be parties and give
evidence and the right to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons
and property as among the rights protected by the Civil Rights Act of 1866).
60 Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323, 330 (1926).
61 See Gressman, supra note 1, at 1342 n.49 (citing Hodges v. United States, 203 U.S. 1 (1906)).
62 427 U.S. 160 (1976).
63 Id. at 168.
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offeror refuses to extend to a Negro, solely because he is a Negro, the same
opportunity to enter into contracts as he extends to [White offerees."4
The Court's decision that § 1981 applies to private discrimination in
the making of contracts injects a far reaching federal civil rights aspect into
a broad range of previously relatively unregulated private economic transactions. The best illustration of this is the context of Runyon itself.65 In
that case, the plaintiffs sued private elementary schools in Virginia under §
1981 after they were told that their children were ineligible for admission
to the schools because they were not White. The Court held that the racially motivated refusal of the schools to make contracts with the plaintiffs
violated § 1981. Given that segregated private schools were one instrument used by Southern Whites to avoid integration after Brown v. Board of
Education,66 this holding had potential social significance beyond the typical statutory construction decision.
To decide that § 1981 reached private racially-based refusals to contract, the Court had to overcome several obstacles similar to those that
stood in the way of its holding that § 1982 covered private discrimination
in property transactions. First is the textual argument, pressed in dissent by
Justice White, joined by Justice Rehnquist, that private discrimination does
not affect Blacks' right to make and enforce contracts-only racially biased legal doctrines could affect rights.67 The Court had to reject this argument or it would have been forced to revisit its decision that the identically phrased § 1982 reached private discrimination. Second, there was a
legitimate question over whether § 1981 had been passed pursuant to the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments or only the Fourteenth Amendment, which is confined to state action. The historical note appended to §
1981 in the United States Code stated that § 1981 was derived from the
Enforcement Act of 1870, a statute passed under the Fourteenth Amendment only.68 The Court concluded that this historical note is erroneous, and
that because the substance of § 1981 was included in the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, § 1981 was passed pursuant to both amendments, thus partaking
of the Thirteenth Amendment's ability to reach private conduct.6 9
There were also several related arguments that counseled in favor of
64 Id. at 170-71 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981). Although the personhood granting
provisions of §

1981 are very important in terms of establishing racial equality, most of the litigation under § 1981 has
been under the "make and enforce contracts" provision which governs private contractual relations.
65 Id. at 172. Other cases had previously held that § 1981 reached discrimination in private contracts, see. e.g., Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975), but Runyon is the leading case
because it focused on the issue and stated its holding more emphatically than prior decisions.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
67
Runyon,427 U.S. at 193-95 (White, J.,
dissenting).
68 Id. at 168 n.8 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (historical note)).
69 Id.
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limiting § 1981 to state action, or at least to a subset of private contracts
that would not have included the contracts at issue in Runyon. There are
several different angles to this issue. Stated most simply, as Justice White
argued in dissent, the right to make contract has never included the right to
force an unwilling partner into a contractual relationship, so Blacks are not
deprived of equal contract rights as long as both Blacks and Whites can
refuse to make contracts on racial grounds. This argument is swept away
in the Court's assertion, quoted above, that Blacks and Whites do not enjoy
the same rights "if a private offeror refuses to extend to a Negro, solely
because he is a Negro, the same opportunity to enter into contracts as he
extends to [W]hite offerees."7
Another argument related to privacy concerns is that § 1981 should not
be applied to private schools because they are not commercial establishments, but rather are private associations of parents using the schools as the
mechanism for educating their children. The defendants pressed this argument by suggesting that the Court apply to § 1981 a "private club" defense that Congress wrote into the Civil Rights Act of 1964."' The Court
rejected this argument on the basis that the schools sued in Runyon were
not private in that sense since they advertised in the Yellow Pages and with
mass mailings, and thus were not exclusive except as to race.
Additional privacy-related limitations on § 1981 focus on the nature of
the contracts at issue in Runyon and parental rights to direct their childrens'
upbringing and education. The defendants in Runyon argued that associational rights, parental rights, and privacy rights would be violated if they
were forced to open their private school to all applicants regardless of race.
The Court answered all three of these defenses with the same basic point,
which is that while parents and schools might have the right to believe in,
and even promote, racial segregation, none of these rights is strong enough
to allow anyone to engage in the actual practice of racial discrimination.
The Court's application of § 1981 to the private school setting thus entailed
a strong embrace of the principle that racial discrimination as a practice is
of no value under the United States Constitution. 72
Another way in which the Court has, in recent years, been quite liberal
in its application of § 1981 is in its decisions on what constitutes racial
70 Id. at 170-71.

71Id. at 172 n.10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(e) (1994)).
72 Id. at 176. The Court has also rejected similar defenses under more recent statutes
that prohibit
gender discrimination mainly on the ground that the regulated activities were not sufficiently private or
expressive to warrant protection as an intimate association. See Bd. of Dirs. of Rotary Int'l v. Rotary
Club, 481 U.S. 537, 548-49 (1987); Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 621,627 (1984). The Court
has accepted First Amendment defenses to civil rights liability in cases involving discrimination based
on homosexuality. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 661 (2000); Hurley v. Irish-Am.
Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group, 515 U.S. 557, 559 (1995).
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discrimination. The Court has defined race quite broadly to include groups
such as Arabs and Jews, on the basis that Congress in 1866 and 1870
would have understood the term "race" to have a much broader meaning
than the three groupings commonly understood as races today.73 Further,
the Court has also allowed Whites to use § 1981 to challenge racial discrimination against themselves,74 despite the obvious textual difficulty that
the statute grants everyone the same rights as "White citizens." It is difficult to imagine how a White citizen could be deprived of the same rights as
White citizens, but the Court is apparently willing to ignore the statutory
language in favor of application to achieve its purpose of eradicating racial
discrimination in contracts.
Overall, the Court's application of § 1981 has, in the past few decades,
been very generous, certainly in keeping with Professor Gressman's vision
of the potential presented by the Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes.75
Advocates of broad application of § 1981 have not been happy with every
Supreme Court decision on the statute's reach. The Court has rejected
application of disparate impact theory to § 1981, requiring proof of intentional discrimination to make out a § 1981 claim,76 and it has rejected vicarious liability of employers under § 1981 for racial discrimination committed by employees.' However, these and other instances of relatively
narrow application have not rendered the statute virtually useless, as was
the case when Professor Gressman wrote. Rather, from the perspective of
civil rights advocates, it is a case of some significant losses within a largely
favorable legal regime.
A more significant set of judicial limitations on § 1981 grew out of a
case in which the Court reconsidered its decision that § 1981 reached private conduct. In Pattersonv. McLean Credit Union,7 s Brenda Patterson, a
Black woman, sued the credit union after she was fired from her position as
teller and file coordinator. She alleged that she had been harassed, passed
over for promotion and ultimately fired as a result of racial discrimination.
After arguments, the Court asked for briefs on whether Runyon should be
73 See Saint Francis Coll. v. A1-Khazraji, 481 U.S. 604, 613 (1987); Shaare Tefila Congregation
v. Cobb,
481 U.S. 615, 617 (1987).
74
See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984).
75 In Johnson v. Ry. Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 459-60 (1975), the Court decided that Title
VII was not the exclusive remedy for racial discrimination in private employment and that victims of
such discrimination could sue under both Title VII and § 1981. It explained that employees are better
off having both remedies available because the statute of limitations for Title VII is 180 days, much
shorter than for § 1981. Id. at 462. There were additional procedural reasons for preferring § 1981 to
Title VII, many of which have been eliminated by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which applied many of
§ 198176's procedural features to Title VII cases. See 42 U.S.C. § 198 1a (1994).
See Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass'n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 391 (1982).
77 Id. at 391, 396.
78 491 U.S. 164(1989).
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overruled insofar as it held that § 1981 reaches private racial discrimination.79 This set off a firestorm of activity, with numerous persons, organizations and officials filing amicus curiae briefs on both sides of the issue.
In deciding not to overrule Runyon, Justice Kennedy's opinion for the
Court did not defend the correctness of Runyon's interpretation of § 1981.
Rather, the decision not to overrule rested on the conclusion that the conditions for overruling a well-established statutory precedent, such as changed
circumstances or unworkability, were not present.80 Further, the Court
found that Runyon fit well with contemporary ideals of social justice:
Whether Runyon's interpretation of § 1981 as prohibiting racial
discrimination in the making and enforcement of private contracts
is right or wrong as an original matter, it is certain that it is not inconsistent with the prevailing sense of justice in this country. To
the contrary, Runyon is entirely consistent with our society's deep
commitment to the eradication of discrimination based on a person's race or the color of his or her skin.8'
Justice Kennedy's reasoning demonstrates that statutory interpretation
at the Supreme Court involves more than a search for the meaning of
words or the intent of the legislature that passed the statute. Prevailing
moral views and coherence with the larger body of law heavily influence
statutory interpretation. Justice Kennedy's statement implies that if the
converse had been true-if the Court not only had gotten the meaning of
the statute wrong but also had been out of step with society's moral norms,
the Court would have corrected its errors.
Although the Court did not overrule Runyon, it did limit § 198 1's reach
based on textual considerations somewhat inconsistent with the highly nontextual methodology that had characterized most of the Court's pronouncements regarding § 1981. The Court held that Patterson's claims
based on racial harassment and racially motivated firing were not actionable under § 1981 because harassment and firing did not implicate the
"making or enforcement" of a contract.82
The Court began its analysis of these issues by stating that neither harassment nor termination were encompassed in § 1981's reference to the
same right to "make" contracts. As long as an employer offers jobs to applicants regardless of race, there is no violation of the equal right to make
79

Id. at 171.
8o Id. at 173.
81 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 174. Given the similarity in language between the two statutes, the
Court might also have been influenced by the realization that overruling Runyon might have entailed
also overruling the holding in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), insofar as Jones held
that private discrimination in property transactions violates § 1982.
82 Patterson,491 U.S. at 176-77.
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contracts. 3 The Court then stated that the guarantee of an equal right to
"enforce" contracts "embraces protection of a legal process," and cannot be
violated by a contracting party through harassment or termination.84 Thus,
the plaintiff's claims relating to harassment and termination are not within
§ 1981's protection of the right to make and enforce contracts.
This may be a sensible understanding of the right to "enforce" a contract both textually and with regard to the Court's best estimation of the
intent behind the statute. However, once the right to "make" a contract is
understood to go beyond legal capacity to enter into a contract and include
discrimination in a private party's decision of whether to enter into a contract, it is inconsistent to read "enforce" differently. 5 The Court's narrow
reading of "enforce" also, when viewed in isolation, suffers from serious
shortcomings as a policy matter. An employer could avoid § 1981 liability
by engaging in a plan to hire applicants on a nondiscriminatory basis and
then discriminatorily fire people based on race. While this plan might violate the "make" provision of § 1981, the violation could be very difficult to
detect.
The decision in Patterson did not have lasting negative effects for two
reasons. First, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides an action
against racially motivated harassment and termination which, in most
cases, is an adequate substitute for § 1981 liability in employment, where
most § 1981 cases arise.86 Second, Congress quickly overruled Patterson,
providing in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in a provision codified as §
1981(b), that "make and enforce contracts" includes "the making, performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and the enjoyment of all
benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual relationship.""
In sum, with regard to § 1981, as with § 1982, the situation is no longer
"unhappy" to one analyzing it from Professor Gressman's perspective.
The statute now stands as a wide-ranging ban on racial discrimination in
contractual relationships. It has been used to attack racial discrimination in
private schools and is a significant source of employment discrimination
litigation, often reinforcing Title VII, especially where Title VII's short
statute of limitations stands as an impediment to vindication of rights under
that statute.8 8
83

Id. at 184.

84Id. at 177.
85

In particular, the statutory construction canon noscitur a sociis counsels that words are under-

stood in light of their "associates," i.e., the other words in the same portion of the statute. Here, if
"make" relates to private conduct, then arguably so does "enforce."
86 See Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21, 22 (1993).
87 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (1994).
88 A charge of a violation of Title VII must be filed with either the federal Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") or a state agency within 180 days of the alleged violation. See 42
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The revolutionary expansion of the coverage of §§ 1981 and 1982 has
also undermined the importance of the Civil Rights Cases,89 in which the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional the Civil Rights Act of 1875. 90
The Civil Rights Act of 1875 was a public accommodations statute, prohibiting theaters, restaurants, hotels and the like from discriminating based on
race. Section 1981 now prohibits much of the discrimination that would
have been prohibited in the Civil Rights Act of 1875. Any refusal of a
theater, hotel, restaurant or other business to serve a person because of their
race, or to treat that person differently because of their race (for example,
through segregation), would violate the equal right to make contracts as
currently understood. Thus, not only has the Court moved beyond the unhappy history with regard to §§ 1981 and 1982, it has effectively revived
the legal regime Congress intended the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to create,
thereby outlawing racially motivated refusals to contract. 9'
3. Section 1983
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory of the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress...
92

Section 1983 represents the primary vehicle used by private parties to
vindicate their constitutional rights against state and local government officials. It provides an action in federal court for damages and injunctive
relief against state and local officials who violate federal rights. Since the
early 1960s, it has been the source of a great deal of litigation, and the
Court has rendered numerous decisions shaping the action it creates.
At the time Professor Gressman wrote, § 1983 was used infrequently,
but it is unclear exactly why that was so. The statutory language limited
the § 1983 action to claims against those acting "under color" of state or
local law, custom or usage, so there was no need for a judicial decision
U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e) (1994). The statute of limitations for § 1981 is whatever the forum state's personal injury statute happens to be, usually two years or more. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482
U.S. 656, 660 (1987).
89 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
90 Id. at 25.
91 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 also contained a public accommodations provision. Title 11of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a (a)-(e) (1994).
92 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
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putting in place such a limitation. Professor Gressman did not focus much
on § 1983, but Professor Louise Weinberg, writing in 1991, has argued that

the lack of litigation under § 1983 at the time Professor Gressman wrote
cannot be explained by Professor Gressman's "unhappy history" theory
since there were no significant decisions limiting the reach of § 1983.9
The explosion in litigation under § 1983 is often traced to the Supreme
Court's 1961 decision in Monroe v. Pape,94 rendered nine years after Professor Gressman wrote. In that case, the Court held that a police officer

acted "under color of" state law even though his conduct violated state
law." This broad interpretation of "under color of" cannot account for the
increase in § 1983 litigation, since, as Professor Louise Weinberg has
pointed out, although § 1983 had been understood more narrowly at one

time, "under color of' had been interpreted to include action in violation of
state law since 1913.96
Multiple factors help explain the paucity of litigation under § 1983 at
the time Professor Gressman wrote and the expansion that occurred after
Monroe. The first, and most important factor, is, as Professor Weinberg

argues, that there were not many constitutional rights that state and local

officials could violate until after Monroe.97 Although there was some

movement by the time Professor Gressman wrote, most of the expansion in
constitutional rights (through incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the
Fourteenth Amendment that gives rise to so much litigation against gov-

ernment and government officials today) did not occur until after 1952."8
In fact, a careful look at Professor Gressman's article reveals that he also
attributed the paucity of litigation under § 1983, then known as 8 U.S.C. §
43, to the lack of enforceable constitutional rights. He wrote, with regard
93 See Louise Weinberg, The Monroe Mystery Solved: Beyond the "Unhappy History" Theory
of
Civil Rights Litigation, 1991 BYU L. REV. 737 (199 1).
94 365 U.S. 167 (1961). Professor Weinberg calculates that in 1961 there were 150 non-prisoner
§ 1983 cases filed in the federal courts and by 1986 there were 10,000, a more than sixty-fold increase.
Weinberg, supra note 93, at 738 n.9 (citing Ruggero Aldisert, JudicialExpansion ofFederalJurisdiction, 1973 L. & Soc. ORD. 557,567 n.44 (1973)).
95 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
96
See Weinberg, supra note 93, at 739 (citing Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 227
U.S. 278 (1913)).
97 Id. at 745-46. Professor Weinberg points out that there was litigation before Monroe against
state and local officials for violating voting rights under the Fifteenth Amendment and for equal protection violations under the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 751-52. However, the scope of rights against
state and local officials did not include the provisions of the Bill of Rights that govern so many interactions between citizens and state and local government today. Id. at 757.
98 For example, the Court held in 1949 that the prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures
applied against state and local officials. See Wolfv. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). However, the Wolf
Court also held that the exclusionary rule, under which illegally seized evidence would not be admitted
at trial, did not apply in state court. See id. at 32. This latter holding was overruled in Mapp v. Ohio,
367 U.S. 643 (1961), in which the Court held that the exclusionary rule applies in state court.
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to § 1983, that "[t]he sole problem here relates to the rights, privileges and
immunities which may be said to be secured by the Constitution and federal laws." 99 Thus, I think it was unfair for Professor Weinberg to criticize
Professor Gressman's unhappy history theory as not explaining § 1983's
dormancy since Professor Gressman and Professor Weinberg offered the
same explanation-the lack of enforceable constitutional rights against
state and local officials. Professor Gressman also referred in a footnote to
the Court's then-recent decision recognizing legislative immunity from
damages under § 1983, perhaps predicting the great effect that immunities
would have on the vitality of the § 1983 remedy. 100
Another angle on this same issue is that the Supreme Court had rejected civil rights prosecutions of state officials for violating the federal
Constitution on the theory that the constitutional rights protected under the
Fourteenth Amendment were only those rights that involved the relationship between the citizen and the federal government and not the citizen and
state governments.'' This is another way of stating that there were few
constitutional rights that had been held to apply against state and local officials that could be used in a § 1983 civil suit.
Prospective plaintiffs and, more important, their lawyers, may have
thought that courts were unlikely to award damages against government
entities and government officials. The general understanding of sovereign
immunity of government entities and common law immunities of government officials may have made civil rights litigation against such defendants
appear hopeless in the period before Professor Gressman wrote.'0 2 There
may also have been a general perception that federal courts were unlikely
to police the activities of state officials, especially in the law enforcement
area, where many potential civil rights claims arise."0 3
For whatever reason or combination of reasons, § 1983, like other Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes, was not a significant source of federal
civil rights litigation at the time Professor Gressman wrote, and it is one
now. The question I wish to address is whether the history of § 1983 litigation since then is still "unhappy," or whether, in light of developments in
the last fifty years, even if things are not perfect, civil rights advocates
should generally be happy with judicial activity under § 1983.
I do not intend to conduct a complete review of the issues under § 1983
99 Gressman, supra note I, at 1355.
100 See id. at 1355 n. 101 (citing Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (195 1)).
I0lSee United States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70, 82 (1951).
102 Once § 1983 litigation really got going in the 1950s, common law immunities were immediately recognized. See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 372; Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237, 239 (7th Cir. 1959).
103 See, e.g., Eaton v. Bibb, 217 F.2d 446, 448-49 (7th Cir. 1954) (recognizing general immunity
of state law enforcement officials from federal civil rights actions); see also Stiff,
267 F.2d at 239
(dismissing claims against police officers for unlawful seizure on authority of Eaton).
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that have come before courts in the last fifty years. There is simply too
much ground to cover, and there are numerous articles that address the
major doctrinal and theoretical issues arising under § 1983.0 I do, however, address some of the major issues and questions of interpretive methodology in order to present an accurate picture of the status of § 1983 litigation in the terms that Professor Gressman used in his article. While I
have my own opinion, each reader can decide for him or herself whether
what I present is a history to be happy or unhappy about.
The first, and most basic point, is that § 1983 is no longer moribund,
and that it certainly can be used in a wide variety of situations to vindicate
federal rights against state and local officials. In this very general sense,
the situation is a far cry from what Professor Gressman observed in 1952.
Section 1983 now provides an action against many state and local violations of the federal Constitution, including, but not limited to, police brutality, unlawful searches and seizures, censorship, unconstitutional prison
conditions, procedurally defective denial and termination of government
benefits, licenses, permits and government employment, interference with
the free exercise of religion, threats of prosecution under unconstitutional
criminal laws, and administrative and legislative violations of equal protection.
In many circumstances, the Court has read § 1983 quite broadly to ensure that it provides an effective remedy. There are, however, substantial
areas in which the federal courts, most notably the Supreme Court, have
read § 1983 narrowly or have applied expansive nontextual defenses to
limit § 1983 liability. The baseline questions previously adverted to become important here. If it is true that the major reason that § 1983 has
become such a large source of federal civil rights litigation over the past
fifty years is the Court's expansion of constitutional rights, then the Court
deserves credit for § 1983's utility, and narrow readings of § 1983 should
be understood in that context. Thus, while what follows focuses on purely
statutory issues, the bottom line has to include the expansive constitutional
rulings that have made § 1983 a significant source of litigation, and there
should be little doubt that things are happier now than fifty years ago for
civil rights plaintiffs generally, and less happy for potential civil rights
defendants.
The first major twentieth-century development regarding § 1983,
which actually occurred just before Professor Gressman wrote, is the recognition of common law immunities, absolute and qualified, as defenses to

104 See, e.g., A SECTION 1983 CIVIL RIGHTS ANTHOLOGY (Sheldon H. Nahmod ed., Anderson

Publishing 1993); Jack M. Beermann, A CriticalApproach to Section 1983 with Special Attention to
Sources ofLaw, 42 STAN. L. REV. 51 (1989).
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§ 1983 liability. 05 The Court began with absolute legislative immunity,'0 6

and quickly recognized absolute immunities for officials performing judicial' 7 and prosecutorial functions. 1 8 The Court also held that all officials
performing discretionary functions are entitled to qualified immunity from
damages, which means that officials acting in good faith under a reasonable interpretation of existing law are immune from damages liability."
These immunities severely limit the utility of § 1983's damages remedy.
The theory under which the Court has recognized the immunities, and
other nontextual defenses to § 1983 liability, is that courts should assume
that Congress meant to preserve well-established common law doctrines
unless those doctrines were rejected by explicit statutory language. 1o This
restates the canon of statutory construction that statutes in derogation of
common law should be strictly construed, and it is used (forgetting that as a
remedial statute § 1983 should be broadly construed to accomplish its remedial purposes) to narrow § 1983's textual scope."'
One way to get a better picture of § 1983 is to simply enumerate some
of the major issues that have arisen with a brief statement of how the Court
has resolved them.
"Under color of": The Court has held that officials act under color of
law whenever their actions are facilitated by or somehow connected to
their positions as government officials, even if they act contrary to state
law." 2 Private individuals act under color of state law when acting in concert with state officials,' but public defenders, even though they are state
105 See generally Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (recognizing immunity for state legislators, a state legislative committee, and others).
106 Id. at 378-79.
107 Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,554-55 n.9 (1967).
108 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 410 (1976).
109Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 326 (1975).

The Court later removed the subjective element of the immunity defense, holding that officials are immune even if they act in bad faith as long as
they do not violate clearly established constitutional rights. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
815-19 (1982).
110 Another example of a nontextual defense based on well-established common law is the rule
that § 1983 cannot be used to challenge the legality of an arrest or criminal conviction or sentence
unless and until the criminal defendant has prevailed and the charges have been dropped, the conviction
overturned or the sentence voided. See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477,489 (1994).
III Courts recognize that they are applying the common law in the face of contrary statutory text,
but in their view, the text is not explicit enough in its rejection of the common law background. With
regard to common law immunities, § 1983 states that "[e]very person" who commits the enumerated
acts "shall be liable." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). The courts in the 1950s that recognized official immunities as defenses to § 1983 liability agreed that, in light of case law accepting immunity defenses,
"[t]he argument that liability under the Federal Civil Rights Act may apply to 'every person' is no
longer tenable." Stift v. Lynch, 267 F.2d 237,239 (7th Cir. 1959).
112 Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 184-87 (1961).
113 Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24,27-28 (1980).
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employees, do not act under color of law when representing defendants
against the state unless they conspire with government officials to the detriment of their clients. 1 4 It is likely that private prison operators will be
held to act under color of law.
"Person": Local governments, but not state governments, are persons
subject to § 1983 liability." 5 State and local government officials are also
persons under § 1983, except that state officials sued in their official capacity are not § 1983 persons," 6 because such a suit seeks a remedy against
the state itself, not against the individual official. Neither government officials nor local governments may be held liable on a vicarious liability basis." 7 8 Officials must be personally involved in a violation to be held liable."
Local Government Liability:" 9 Local government entities are liable
only for official policies 2 or where there is a strong basis for finding that a
violation was caused by a local government's culpable conduct.' 2 ' The
Court has not required that policies be formally stated by the local government's legislative body. It has allowed for liability based on policies formulated by individual officials with final authority,' even when the policy
is designed to cover only one situation and does not state a general rule."z
However, the Court has been very reluctant to hold government liable
when a policy is difficult to identify, for example when a claim is based on
a city's failure to train employees2 or failure to adequately check employees' backgrounds before hiring them.'"
Alternative Remedies: Section 1983 plaintiffs are not required to exhaust state judicial or administrative remedies before filing suit under §
1983.26 Related to the no exhaustion rule, § 1983 plaintiffs are not required to follow state notice of claim provisions before suing state officials
114 See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,324-25'(1981).
115 Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989); Monell v. New York City
Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658, 690 (1978).
116 Will,491 U.S. at71.
117 Monell, 436 U.S. at 692 n.57; Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001).
118 Gaston,249 F.3d at 164.
119 For a review of municipal liability under § 1983, see generally Jack M. Beermann, Municipal
Responsibility
for ConstitutionalTorts, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 627 (1999).
12 0
Monell, 436 U.S. at 692.
121 Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397,404 (1997).
122 Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469,481 (1986).
123Id.

124 City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 380 (1989); Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808,
823-24 (1985).
125 Brown, 520 U.S. at 415-16 (1997).
126 Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 498 (1982).
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either in state or federal court.' 27 However, in some areas, such as § 1983
suits in equity challenging confinement pursuant to state criminal process128 and § 1983 suits alleging unequal educational opportunities for
handicapped children,'29 the Court has held that Congress has replaced §
1983 liability with liability under an alternative statute that may not be as
favorable as § 1983 either procedurally or in terms of available remedies
including attorneys fees. The Court has also approved enforcement of
agreements under which potential civil rights claimants surrender their
right to sue in exchange for dismissal of related criminal charges.' 3' Further, issue preclusion and claim preclusion apply with full force to § 1983
(and the other Reconstruction-Era civil rights statutes), which means that in
some cases, state litigation will displace litigation under § 1983.1' For
example, decisions in criminal cases in state court might have preclusive
effect in subsequent § 1983 litigation even though the § 1983 plaintiff was
involuntarily litigating in state court.' 32 The Court has even gone beyond
traditional preclusion doctrines and created a doctrine under which unappealed state administrative decisions can have preclusive effect in federal
court if such decisions have preclusive effect in state court.'33 Finally, the
Court has approved applying abstention doctrines in § 1983 cases, which
means that despite Congress's strong preference for the availability of a
federal forum for § 1983 cases, in some cases plaintiffs must present their
federal claims in state court, subject to possible return to federal court or at
least review in the Supreme Court of ihe United States.' 34
Official Immunities: As discussed above, all government official §
1983 defendants are entitled to either an absolute or qualified immunity
from damages. Judges, legislators and prosecutors are absolutely immune
from damages when performing the functions implied in their respective
127

Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 134 (1988).

128 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 500 (1973).
129 Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1021 (1984). The Court in Smith also ruled against attorneys fees for prevailing plaintiffs in such cases. Congress overruled the Court on this point in the
Handicapped Children's Protection Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(3)(B) (1994).
130 See Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,394 (1987). This facilitates a pattern of abuse
that may be widespread, in which police cover up civil rights violations such as excessive force or
arrest without probable cause by charging the victim falsely with serious crimes and then agreeing to
drop the criminal charges in exchange for freedom from suit under § 1983. The Court in Rumery was
unwilling to assume that such abuse was likely. Id. at 397.
131 Migra v. Warren City Sch. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 84-85 (1984).
132 Allen v. MeCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 91, 105 (1980).
133 Univ. of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788,798-99 (1986).
134 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53-54 (1971). See also Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,
242-43 (1972) (indicating that § 1983 is an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, but
federal plaintiffs may still be required, under abstention doctrines, to present their federal issues in state
court).
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"'
titles. 35
Legislators are also immune from injunctive relief' 36 Further,

administrative agency officials fulfilling judicial, legislative and prosecuto-

rial functions receive absolute immunity when performing those functions
even though they are not actually judges, legislators or prosecutors.'
The
Court has refused to extend absolute judicial immunity when the traditional
safeguards of the judicial process are absent. 3 However, the Court has
extended absolute legislative immunity to officials who appear to be legislating without regard to whether either the traditional safeguards of the
legislative process, or an adequate substitute, are present.'39
The Court has expanded the qualified immunity substantially beyond

its traditional common law limitations. Under the common law, upon
which the Court relied in recognizing the immunities, only officials acting
in good faith were entitled to immunity from damages. The Court was
persuaded by policy arguments to extend qualified immunity to officials

acting in bad faith, as long as they do not violate a clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable official should have known."4 The
Court has held that a right is not clearly established unless the right has
already been held to have been violated under facts not significantly different from the case under decision.' 4' Generally stated, rights such as the

right to be free from an unreasonable search and seizure are not sufficient
135 Because officials often engage in functions other than the one indicated by their title, the
Court developed what is known as the "functional approach" to immunities, granting absolute immunity to claims arising only from the performance of the function for which absolute immunity was
traditionally recognized and not from claims arising from other functions performed by the same official. For example, prosecutors receive absolute immunity from claims arising from prosecutorial
activity such as eliciting false testimony at a probable cause hearing but not for activity related to the
investigation of a crime such as giving legal advice to police regarding whether they should hypnotize a
suspect. See Bums v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478,481 (1991). Similarly, judges receive absolute immunity in
cases arising from the performance of the judicial function but not in cases arising from the performance of an administrative function such as hiring and firing court employees. See Forrester v. White,
484 U.S. 219,220-21 (1988).
136 See Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951). Congress made it more difficult to
enjoin unconstitutional judicial conduct when it amended § 1983 to prohibit injunctions against judges
unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(1994). This amendment was designed to limit Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984), in which the
Court held thatjudges were subject to injunctive relief under § 1983.
137 See Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union, 446 U.S. 719, 739 (1980) (granting absolute
immunity to state courts performing legislative functions); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 512-13
(1978) ("[A]djudication within a federal administrative agency shares enough of the characteristics of
the judicial process that those who participate in such adjudication should also be immune from suits
for damages.").
138 Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193,206 (1985).
139 See Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'! Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 406 (1979)
(refusing to extend absolute judicial immunity to prison disciplinary committee made up of prison
guards).
140 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
141Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 641 (1987).
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to overcome qualified immunity without clearly applicable precedent.
However, the Court has refused to extend qualified immunity to private
persons acting under color of law, such as guards in privately run prisons 4 '
and private individuals who conspire with government officials to violate
civil rights.'43
Remedies: The remedies available under § 1983 are governed by traditional common law and equity doctrines with some variations. The Supreme Court has held that damages are limited to the damages available at
common law for those injuries recognized under common law principles.'
Courts may not award § 1983 damages based on the abstract importance of
the constitutional rights involved or on any other basis than the actual injuries suffered by the plaintiff. Actual injuries may include a jury's valuation
of difficult to quantify injuries, such as the deprivation of the right to speak
or vote, but the jury may not include consideration of the importance of the
right in the legal system as an element of damages.' 4 5 This means that
there are categories of constitutional violations that are not worth suing
over, because there will be no damages other than nominal damages, and §
1983 will thus not deter continuing violations.'46 Punitive damages are
available in § 1983 cases where the defendant exhibits a reckless disregard
for the rights of the plaintiff-intentional or malicious misconduct is not
required.'47 Injunctive relief is available only where there is a 'likelihood
of substantial and immediate irreparable injury.' and no adequate remedy
at law.'" This appears to be a somewhat heightened standard since equity
does not usually require that irreparable harm be "substantial and immediate."
Attorneys Fees: After the Supreme Court stated that attorneys fees
were not generally available to victorious civil rights plaintiffs, 49 Congress, in 1976, passed a statute providing district courts discretion to award

142 Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399,412 (1997).

143 Wyatt v. Cole, 504 U.S. 158, 168-69 (1992).
144 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247,257-58 (1978).
145 Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).
146 The best example of this is procedural due process, where the Court has ruled that plaintiffs
that would have lost at a hearing that was unconstitutionally withheld can recover only nominal damages for the deprivation of due process. See Carey,435 U.S. at 266-67.
147 Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30,56
(1983).
148 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 103 (1983) (quoting O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.
488,502 (1974)).
149 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975). In Alyeska Pipeline
Service Co., the Court held that federal courts lack the power to award attorney's fees absent explicit
statutory authorization. Id. at 267-68. The Court explicitly expressed disagreement with lower court
decisions in which civil rights plaintiffs were awarded fees on a private attorney general theory. See id
at 270 n.46.
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attorneys fees to the prevailing party in civil rights actions.'
The Court
has been fairly liberal in interpreting and applying this statute in § 1983
litigation. The Court has held that attorneys fees are available almost as of
right to prevailing plaintiffs, but that prevailing defendants should be
awarded fees only in extreme circumstances of vexatious, frivolous, or
harassing litigation."' The Court has rejected attempts to deny fees when a
plaintiff does not prevail on the "central issue" raised by the litigation, and
has not required that plaintiffs always segregate fees on losing issues from
fees on winning issues.'
The Court has also allowed awards of marketrate fees to nonprofit legal aid attorneys5 . and has held that fees need not
be proportionate to damages and might substantially exceed damages in
cases with social importance beyond the damages actually awarded." On
the other side, the Court has stated that fees are limited to hours expended
times a reasonable market rate, and that fee enhancement for novel, difficult, or important cases is not normally available.'
Further, the Court has
approved class action settlements under which plaintiffs waive legal fees in
exchange for other remedies, despite the chilling effect such agreements
might have on attorneys' willingness to litigate § 1983 cases.' 56 Finally,
the Court has held that, in cases in which only nominal damages are
awarded, while the plaintiff is a prevailing party, the reasonable attorneys'
fee for procuring a nominal damages award is usually no fee at all.'
State Law Defenses: In some very limited circumstances, the Court has
sanctioned applying the law of the forum state to fill gaps in § 1983 cases,
usually to allow defendants to take advantage of state law defenses. The
basis for this is a provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 that instructed
federal district courts to fill gaps in civil rights statutes with "the common
law, as modified and changed by the constitution and statutes" of the forum
state.' Under this provision, the Court has applied state statutes of limitations" 9 and state survivorship statutes to § 1983 cases."ea The basis for
applying state law in these two situations is that without some provision on
ISO Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976,42 U.S.C. §

1988(b) (1994).
151 The Court's decision against attorneys fees for prevailing defendants in most cases was based
upon legislative history that was not reflected in the text of the statute. See Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461
U.S. 424,429
n.2 (1983) (citing H.R. REP. No. 94-1558, at 7 (1976)).
15 2
Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 790-91 (1989).
153 Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984).
154 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575-77 (1986).
155 Blum, 465 U.S. at 898.
156 Evans v. Jeff D., 475 U.S. 717,730-32 (1986).
157 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992).
158 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (1994).
159 Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261,269 (1985).
160 Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584,593 (1978).
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survivorship and limitations, the § 1983 action would be unworkable. The
Court has held that state law applies only insofar as it does not undermine
federal interests. Thus, for example, the Court has stated that the federal
interest in deterrence would not allow a § 1983 claim to abate on the death
of the plaintiff when death was caused by the constitutional violation. 6'
Further, the federal interest in simplicity of litigation demands that all §
1983 claims be governed by the state statute of limitations for personal
injury actions, even if analogous state claims or state civil rights claims are
governed by various statutes of limitations. 6 2
63
The Official Tort Dilemma: Since shortly after Monroe v. Pape,
plaintiffs have brought ordinary tort claims to federal court under § 1983,
arguing that the official's tortious conduct amounts to a deprivation of liberty or property without due process since no hearing or other process is
provided before a tort is committed. In these cases, the Court has struggled
to distinguish between true civil rights claims and common law torts that
happen to have been committed by an official acting under color of law.
The Court's theory is that ordinary torts committed by government officials
should not automatically give rise to § 1983 litigation simply because they
were committed by a defendant acting "under color of' law. The developments in this area have been mainly in constitutional law, in cases holding that adequate state post-deprivation remedies can satisfy procedural
due process for random and unauthorized torts' and that mere negligence
is not enough to constitute a deprivation of life, liberty or property under
the Due Process Clause. 6 ' One particularly perplexing issue is whether
malicious prosecution by police officers is always a constitutional violation.' 66 This line of cases has been controversial, with substantial dis161 Id. at 594-95.
162 Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
163365 U.S. 167 (196 1), overruledby Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Serv., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
164 See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 543 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Daniels
v.
Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986). On the other hand, the Court has held that deprivations of liberty or
property pursuant to "established state procedures" can violate due process regardless of the availability
of post-deprivation state remedies. The line between "random and unauthorized" deprivations and
deprivations pursuant to "established state procedures" is far from clear, and some decisions recognizing § 1983 claims appear to be in tension with Parrattin that they find due process violations where a
state official departed from required procedures. See, e.g., Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 133-34
(1990) (holding that due process was violated by a state official who allowed a mentally incompetent
person to commit himself to a psychiatric hospital without following procedures for determining
whether person was competent to make commitment decision).
165 See Daniels, 474 U.S. at 328.
166 The Supreme Court, in Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 274-75 (1994), held that malicious
prosecution does not violate due process, but it explicitly left open the issue of whether malicious
prosecution might violate the Fourth Amendment. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in denying a malicious prosecution claim under § 1983 erroneously stated that "(t]he law is settled that a garden-variety claim of malicious prosecution garbed in the regalia of § 1983 must fail." Roche v. John
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agreement over whether all state official torts raise federal constitutional
concerns, especially
when state immunities preclude or limit compensation
67
court.
state
in
Eleventh Amendment and Sovereign Immunity: Another constitutional
area that is important to § 1983 civil rights litigation is the Court's creation
of a broad doctrine of sovereign immunity, initially under the Eleventh
Amendment but now substantially broader than that constitutional provision, to limit damages and other retrospective remedies against the state
itself. Although the Court has held that Congress has the power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to abrogate state sovereign immu-

nity, 68 the Court has held that Congress did not do so when it passed §
1983.69 The Court has held for over 100 years that the Eleventh Amendment bars suits based on federal law for damages against states even
though the language of the amendment suggests that it is limited to diversity based actions.'
Further, the Court has prohibited damages actions
against states by their own citizens even though the amendment's language
bars only suits by "Citizens of another State."''
Recently, in fact, the
Court has acknowledged that its sovereign immunity doctrine is less a crea-

ture of the Eleventh Amendment than its own understanding of state
sover72
eign immunity principles that predate the Eleventh Amendment.
The Court has used the Eleventh Amendment and related sovereign
immunity principles to severely limit the remedies available against states
under § 1983. For example, the Court has held that the Eleventh Amendment prohibits an order requiring a state to refund benefits wrongfully

withheld 73 and it even bars an order informing victims of state illegality

Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 81 F.3d 249, 256 (Ist Cir. 1996) (Selya, J.). Judge Selya's misstatement
that the law is settled against a federal constitutional right to be free from malicious prosecution is
puzzling because immediately after making the statement, he noted that the Supreme Court left open
the issue of whether malicious prosecution violates the Fourth Amendment:
Although the Supreme Court left open the possibility that a malicious prosecution claim
might lie under § 1983 on the basis of the Fourth Amendment, .. . we need not explore this
virgin territory. Even assuming the vitality of such an approach, the existence of probable
cause vitiates any arguable Fourth Amendment claim.
Id. at 256 n.5 (internal citation omitted). More recently, Judge Selya has written an opinion in which
the First Circuit acknowledges that whether malicious prosecution violates the Fourth Amendment
remains an open question at the Supreme Court level. See Nieves v. McSweeney, 241 F.3d 46, 54 (ist
Cir. 2001).
167 See generallyJack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and the Takings Clause: Federalism and StateSovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REV. 277 (1988).
168 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,456 (1976).
169 See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 67 (1989); Alabama v. Pugh, 438
U.S. 781,782 (1978); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651,673-74 (1974).
170 See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890).
171See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,711-12 (1999).
172 See id. at 713.
173See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974).
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that they can seek a retrospective remedy in state court. 74 The only significant exception to the general bar against remedies against the state is
the longstanding Ex parte Young fiction, under which courts allow prospective injunctive remedies to run against states by issuing the order in the
name of the state official expected to carry out the court order.'75
The cumulative effects of the various doctrines that limit the availability of damages and, in some cases, injunctive remedies under § 1983 lead
to a paradox. On the one hand, § 1983 generates a vast amount of litigation, and in many cases it appears to be a potent weapon for attacking unconstitutional conduct by state and local officials. On the other hand, because of official immunities, sovereign immunity and restrictions on municipal liability, effective remedies are not available in probably a large
majority of instances of state and local unconstitutional conduct. Thus,
even in light of the expansion of constitutional rights that has occurred
since Professor Gressman wrote, it is difficult to reach a firm conclusion on
whether Professor Gressman's general criticisms of court treatment of civil
rights legislation still holds with regard to § 1983.
There are good arguments that the "unhappy history" assessment still
holds for § 1983, especially in light of the Court's methodology for interpreting § 1983. The Court often appears to be struggling against Congress's language and intent, employing what Professor Gressman termed
"strict constructionism." The Court employs several inconsistent methods
for interpreting § 1983 and for filling doctrinal gaps in § 1983 cases, and
the Court has not provided any guidance on when each of the several
methods applies.' 76 The various methods include textual interpretation,
interpretation against the background of nineteenth century common law,
interpretation in light of contemporary common law, use of the law of the
forum state to fill gaps in § 1983, and pure policy based interpretation. The
Court has never even attempted to explain when a particular methodology
applies and when it does not. This creates an appearance of result-oriented
decisionmaking that cannot withstand the scrutiny of commentators. Each
invocation of a particular method of construing § 1983 appears false since
the Court could have chosen a different methodology that might have
pointed to a different result.'7 7
The best example of this phenomenon may be the Court's recognition
and elaboration of official immunities. I will focus on one small episode,
174 See Quem v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 334-35 (1979).

175 209 U.S. 123, 160-66 (1908).
176 See generally, Beermann, supra note 104.
177 1 believe that this is why so much § 1983 scholarship focuses on methodology. See generally

id.; Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983 Discourse: The Move from Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. L.J. 1719
(1989).
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that is noted above, in the immunities saga. Top aides to President Richard
Nixon asked the Court to grant them absolute immunity based on their
status as presidential advisors.'78 The Court refused, but it recognized that
qualified immunity provided insufficient protection against harassing litigation, mainly because a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment based
on qualified immunity could often be defeated by allegations or affidavits
that would support a finding that the defendant-official acted in bad faith.
The Court decided that it would be better policy to eliminate the requirement that an official act in good faith to take advantage of qualified immunity. The Court did not refer at all to the common law basis for the qualified immunity even though it is only the common law background that
provides the justification for not making "every person" liable under §
1983, as the statutory language suggests.'79 There are numerous additional
instances in which, in the absence of an adequate explanation from the
Court, it appears that the choice of methodology for interpreting § 1983
follows the choice of a desired result.
One explanation for the Court's inability to explain itself may lie in the
special role of the federal courts in interpreting and applying § 1983. Section 1983 lacks details on many issues that must be resolved for a system
of liability to function properly. The Supreme Court's decision in Monroe
v. Pape,' coupled with the dramatic expansion of constitutional rights
starting in the 1950s and continuing to the present day, created the potential for a large number of § 1983 suits across a wide range of issues. The
federal courts had to function like common law courts and develop a body
of doctrine to govern the tort-like features of the action embodied in the
statute. Unlike state courts, which are accustomed to creating and shaping
tort causes of action, the federal courts might have been unwilling to embrace explicitly their role in shaping the § 1983 action based on normative
considerations. Thus, they struggled, unsuccessfully, to justify their decisions with traditional legal precedent rather than with their views of wise
policy.
An additional reason for viewing the Court's methodological confusion
with suspicion is that Congress attempted, in § 1988, which is referred to
above,' 8 ' to establish an interpretive methodology for § 1983 litigation under which federal judges would have relied heavily on the law of the forum
17 8

See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 802 (1982).
179 Strictly speaking, the Harlow rule was formulated in a case against a federal official arising
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and not § 1983. However, the Court
has traditionally applied the immunities developed in cases against federal officials to § 1983 cases
against state and local officials, and in Harlow, it stated that it would apply the new immunity rule to §
1983 cases. See id. at 818 n.30.
180 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
181 See supratext accompanying note 178.
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state to fill gaps and elaborate concepts in § 1983.8' It may be that the
Supreme Court finds § 1988's methodology, in many situations, unworkable or undesirable, because under it, § 1983 litigation would vary significantly from state to state, with similar cases arising in different states coming out differently, even when decided by the same Court of Appeals or by
the Supreme Court. Disuniformity, coupled with the need for federal
judges to learn the particulars of the law of numerous states, might render §
1988 an undesirable mechanism. However, the Court may be uncomfortable expressing itself in these terms, since under normal circumstances it
must obey statutes that it does not find unconstitutional.
More controversially, the Court may, at different times, feel more or
less uncomfortable with the terms and potential effects of § 1983, especially in light of its own expansion of constitutional rights in recent years.
The Court has sometimes operated under the explicit assumption that a
great deal of § 1983 litigation borders on frivolous and is of marginal social value at best.'83 Section 1983's full textual potential would subject
numerous local governments and officials to vexatious litigation from convicted criminals and people upset with everyday difficulties with state and
local government officials. Because it would be extraordinary for a federal
court to simply declare itself in policy disagreement with Congress over a
statute and then use that disagreement to limit the reach of the statute, the
Court has found it necessary to artificially limit the reach of § 1983.
Perhaps what the Court says in its opinions is much less important than
what it actually does. Looking only at the bottom line, the record is mixed,
with § 1983 providing a cause of action in a large number of instances of
state and local unconstitutional conduct, but with a large number of cases
beyond the reach of § 1983 due to court-created limitations such as immunities. Government indemnification and the ability to state a claim against
a municipality, which puts pressure on municipalities to settle cases, 4 may
mean that § 1983 is a more effective compensatory remedy than might
appear from the reported cases. It should also be noted that Congress has
not amended § 1983 in reaction to restrictive court rulings,' 85 which may
indicate that the Court is not seriously out of step with general expectations
of how § 1983 should be applied. The argument that illogic and inconsistencies in Court opinions should be ignored in favor of the bottom line of
182 42 U.S.C. § 1988(a) (1994).
183 See Town of Newton v, Rumery, 480 U.S. 386,395 (1987).
184 See G. Flint Taylor, A Litigator's View of Discovery and Proofin Police Misconduct Policy
and PracticeCases, 48 DEPAUL L. REV. 747,748-49 (1999).
185 In fact, as noted above, the only major amendment of § 1983 has been to limit the effect of a
construction of § 1983 that was favorable to plaintiffs. See supra note 136 and accompanying text
(describing Congress's treatment of the Court's decision that judges could be sued under § 1983 for
injunctions and held liable for attorney's fees).
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whether plaintiffs can win cases or procure favorable settlements is a serious challenge to the view that the "unhappy history" thesis still holds with
regard to § 1983.
4. Section 1985(3)
If two or more persons in any State or Territory conspire or go in
disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or class
of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and immunities under the laws; or for the purpose of preventing or hindering the constituted authorities of any State or Territory
from giving or securing to all persons within such State or Territory the equal protection of the laws... in any case of conspiracy
set forth in this section, if one or more persons engaged therein do,
or cause to be done, any act in furtherance of the object of such
conspiracy, whereby another is injured in his person or property, or
deprived of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United States, the party so injured or deprived may have
an action for the recovery of damages occasioned by such injury or
deprivation, against any one or more of the conspirators. 86
'
Section 1985(3) was passed as part of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,
and it is the provision that gave that statute its other name, the Ku Klux
Klan Act. This provision was specifically aimed at providing a federal
remedy against the Klan and other groups who used violence and intimidation to prevent Blacks in the South from fully enjoying their freedom. Violations of § 1985(3) were also made criminal by the Act, but, as is discussed below,'87 the criminal provision was declared unconstitutional
shortly after passage. 88
At the time Professor Gressman wrote, § 1985(3) was basically useless
in terms of achieving its purpose of providing a federal claim against racial
violence by groups such as the Ku Klux Klan."89 In 1883, the Supreme
Court struck down § 1985(3)'s criminal counterpart on the ground that
Congress lacked the power under the Fourteenth Amendment to legislate
against the private misconduct that was addressed in the statute.' Because
186 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (1994). This is an edited version of§ 1985(3). 1 have omitted the provisions addressing interference with the right to vote and otherwise participate in federal elections.
187 See infra text accompanying note 191.
188 See United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629,644 (1883).
189 For a more detailed review of the Supreme Court's treatment of § 1985(3), see Jack M. Beermann, The Supreme Court's Narrow View on Civil Rights, 1993 Sup. CT. REv. 199, 214-19 (1994).
Much of the analysis here repeats what I wrote in that article.
190 See Harris, 106 U.S. at 643-44.
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of this ruling, the civil version lay dormant for a long time since people
simply assumed that it was unconstitutional as well.
Further Supreme Court action beginning in the early 1950s ensured
that the statute would remain useless in achieving Congress's goals. In the
1940s, § 1985(3) was rediscovered, and plaintiffs began to bring cases under it over instances of mob violence directed at opposing political groups.
Just before Professor Gressman's article was published, one of these cases
reached the Supreme Court, and the Court held, surprisingly, that, in light
of potential constitutional difficulties, § 1985(3) reached only state action. 9 '
The Court's decision in Collins v. Hardyman, that § 1985(3) was directed mainly at government action, was clearly wrong and illustrates how
much of an obstacle the Court was to the realization of the ReconstructionEra Congress's civil rights goals. Congress clearly had the Ku Klux Klan
in mind when it wrote about going "in disguise on the highway" for the
purpose of depriving people of equal protection, and the Court's conclusion that Congress meant to limit § 1985(3) primarily to state action was
preposterous. The Court itself had seen this in 1883 when it held §
1985(3)'s criminal counterpart unconstitutional because it reached private
conduct. 2 It appears likely that Congress intended § 1985(3) to reach
private conspiracies to prevent people from exercising a wide range of constitutional rights.
After Professor Gressman wrote, the Court realized its error in interpreting § 1985(3) to reach only state action.9 3 However, even though the
Court overruled that holding, it replaced the state action requirement with a
similar limitation that basically renders it of little use in protecting civil
rights from private conspiracies and added a second, less severe, limitation
on the reach of§ 1985(3).
In Griffin v. Breckenridge,'94 the Court was confronted with a classic
case of racially motivated mob violence. A group of White Mississippians
beat a group of Blacks from Mississippi and one person of unspecified race
from Tennessee in whose car the others were riding, under the mistaken
belief that the owner of the car from Tennessee was a civil rights worker.'9 5
The victims sued their attackers under § 1985(3), and after the case was
dismissed by the lower courts on the authority of Collins, the Supreme
191See Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 661-62 (1951). The Court's theory
was that a private
mob cannot deprive other private individuals of the legal rights apparently protected by § 1985(3). Id.
The Court did allow for the possibility that a private group might violate § 1985(3) if it sought to overwhelm the government and thus deprive people of legal rights. Id.
192 See Harris, 106 U.S. at 643-44.
193 See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104
(1971).
194403 U.S. 88 (1971).
195 See id. at 89-90.
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Court reversed and overruled Collins's holding that § 1985(3) reached only
state action.'" The Court relied primarily on the language of § 1985(3),
which on its face contains no "under color of law" limitation and is clearly
directed at private groups such as the Ku Klux Klan.
Once the Court held that Congress intended § 1985(3) to reach private
conspiracies, the Court had to face the difficult question of how a private
group could deprive someone of "equal protection of the laws, or of equal
privileges and immunities under the laws." State action doctrine, which
did not exist when § 1985(3) was written, counsels that only state actors
can violate those constitutional provisions.'97 The Congress that wrote the
statute, however, thought that the Ku Klux Klan violated the equal rights of
Blacks and their supporters when it used terror to prevent and intimidate
Blacks from enjoying basic freedoms such as the right to move about and
engage in economic and social activity.
The Court created two requirements that § 1985(3) plaintiffs must satisfy to successfully state a claim under the statute. The first requirement is
that the defendant must have acted out of class-based animus, and so far
the only animus that the Court has recognized as sufficient has been racial
animus. 8 This requirement grows out of the Court's reading of §
1985(3)'s use of the word "equal." The second requirement is that, with
regard to private conspiracies, defendants can be liable under § 1985(3)
only for transgressing constitutional rights that are capable of being violated by private actors. 9 Only two such rights have been recognized thus
far, freedom from involuntary servitude (slavery) and the right to travel.
The animus requirement does not present a serious impediment to §
1985(3)'s use against racially motivated violations, except for the obvious
problem of proving the required animus. Unless the Court decides to recognize animus against other groups, the requirement does prevent groups
that might be subjected to class-based animus like women, homosexuals,
and religious minorities from using the statute. Since the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protects all identifiable groups
against unreasonable classification,2" it is difficult to understand why the
196See id at 92, 93, 104, 107.
197 There is an obvious parallel to §§ 1981 and 1982, which also refer to "rights." Yet, in those
cases, the Court concluded that private discrimination denies equal rights to those discriminated
against.
198 The Court has not firmly held that only racial animus can violate § 1985(3). It has used the
word "perhaps" when discussing whether some other form of animus, such as animus based on gender,
would suffice. See Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102; see also Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506
U.S. 263,26869 (1993).
199 Griffin, 403 U.S. at 105-07; see also Bray, 506 U.S. at 274.
200 The Court has even held that treating one individual different from other persons similarly
situated can violate equal protection. See Village of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564-65
(2000). Thus, the use of the phrase "equal protection" need not imply class-based animus.
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identical phrase in a statute passed at basically the same time as the
amendment should be given a much narrower meaning.
The limitation of § 1985(3)'s coverage against private conspiracies to
constitutional rights that are capable of being violated by private individuals is much more severe, and basically means that in the vast majority of
cases, Collins v. Hardyman might as well have never been overruled.
Collins's state action requirement is basically still in place except with
regard to two very small categories of conspiracies, those aimed at either
the right to travel or the right to be free from involuntary servitude.
In my view, in light of the text and legislative history of the statute, the
best reading of § 1985(3)'s phrase "equal protection of the laws, or of
equal privileges and immunities under the laws"' is that the phrase encompasses a broad spectrum of rights so that private conspiracies to prevent people from enjoying those rights would be actionable under §
1985(3). For example, a paradigm case of a violation of § 1985(3) would
have been a Ku Klux Klan group burning down the home of a Black family
to prevent Blacks from moving into what had been a Whites only residential area. Since a racial zoning restriction would be unconstitutional, the
conspiracy would have had the effect of preventing the Black family from
exercising its constitutional right to live in any residential neighborhood on
an equal basis with Whites. That right, however, is not guaranteed against
private infringement and thus would not be protected under the Court's
understanding of § 1985(3).
In sum, the history of § 1985(3) is just about as "unhappy" now as it
was when Professor Gressman wrote in 1952. There is only a small category of cases that can be brought under § 1985(3) against private conspirators such as the Ku Klux Klan, but Court decisions with little or no textual
or historical support have drained most of the life blood out of the statute.
The only thing that can be said for the Court is that Congress has not overruled any of the Court's restrictive rulings, but that may be explained by
Congress's attention to new statutes, as outlined in the following part of
this Article. The Supreme Court has prevented Congress from accomplishing with § 1985(3) what it intended.
II. THE CURRENT COURT: MORE RECENT CIVIL RIGHTS STATUTES IN
STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL TERMS

In addition to many significant Court decisions on the ReconstructionEra civil rights statutes, some of the most important developments in civil
201

In my view, this phrase was meant as shorthand for basically all constitutional rights. Con-

gress could not have known that the Supreme Court would read the Privileges and Immunities Clause
as having almost no substantive content.
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rights law since Professor Gressman wrote are the numerous civil rights
statutes that Congress has passed, beginning with the Civil Rights Act of
1957.202 Much of the legislation has involved employment discrimination,
with the most important statute being the Civil Rights Act of 1964,203
which, inter alia, prohibits discrimination in private employment based on
race, sex, religion, and national origin. In addition to amending that Act to
extend its protections to government employees, 2" Congress has legislated
against employment discrimination on several bases including age, disabil25
ity, and pregnancy.
Antidiscrimination law has also gone beyond employment discrimination. Congress has legislated against discrimination in housing," 6 education," 7 and public accommodations 2° and it has attempted legislatively to
require government to accommodate the free exercise of religion. 2°1 Congress has passed a statute prohibiting violence against women. 21' In addi-tion to pure civil rights statutes, Congress has included civil rights provisions in non-civil rights statutes to prohibit discrimination in federal programs and has generally prohibited discrimination by institutions that receive federal funds.2 1 1 After passing no significant civil rights legislation
between 1875 and 1957, civil rights legislation has become ubiquitous.
A significant development in the last forty years has been the expansion of the umbrella of civil rights beyond race discrimination. As noted
above, Title VII took the first step in this regard by banning employment
202 Civil Rights Act of 1957, Pub. L. No. 85-315, 71 Stat. 634 (1957). The Act was mainly a voting rights provision, although it also created the United States Commission on Civil Rights, provided
for an additional Assistant Attorney General to head up the Civil Rights Division of the Justice Department, provided federal jurisdiction over actions for damages or injunctive relief over cases "under
any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote" and granted
the Attorney General the power to institute proceedings to protect voting rights. Id at 637. For background on this statute, see STEVEN F. LAWSON, BLACK BALLOTS: VOTING RIGHTS INTHE SOUTH 19441969, at 165-202 (1976).
203 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
204 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.
205 See 29 U.S.C. § 633a (1994); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (defining discrimination "because of sex"
to include pregnancy); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,42 U.S.C.§ 12112(a) (1994).
206 See Fair Housing Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. § 3601 (1994).
207 See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1400a (1994).
208 See Civil Rights Act of 1964,42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1994).
209 See Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4
(1994). This statute was held unconstitutional in City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511-12
(1997), as beyond Congress's power to enforce Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Congress
responded by passing a new statute very similar to RFRA but under its Commerce and Spending Powers. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000cc to
2000cc-5 (2001).
210 Violence Against Women Act of 1994, 42 U.S.C. § 13981 (1994). This statute was held unconstitutional as beyond Congress's power in United States v. Morrison,529 U.S. 598 (2000).
211 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1994).
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discrimination based on sex and religion in addition to race, national origin
and color. Subsequent laws have attacked discrimination, mainly in the
employment field, based on age,"' disability,2 13 and pregnancy. 2'4 States
have also passed a great deal of civil rights legislation, much of which
deals with similar forms of discrimination and in similar contexts as federal
law. Congress has not significantly addressed discrimination based on
sexual orientation, except in a very limited manner in a statute codifying
the "don't ask don't tell" policy under which homosexuals can remain in
the military service as long as they do not announce their homosexuality. 5
It would be impossible in a single article or even a book of reasonable
length to attempt to review comprehensively recent civil rights statutes and
their judicial treatment. Rather, in what follows, I highlight some of the
major interpretive issues that have arisen under recent civil rights legislation, mainly Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and I address a very
recent line of Supreme Court decisions that limits Congress's power to
legislate in the civil rights area, especially when Congress attempts to allow remedies against states.
A. Interpretationof Recent Civil Rights Legislationand Congress's Reaction
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is probably the most important civil rights statute that Congress has enacted in the past fifty years. As
noted above, Title VII prohibits employment discrimination based on race,
color, sex, religion, and national origin. Congress passed the statute under
its Commerce Power and then in 1972 amended the statute to add coverage
of state and local government employers pursuant to its power to enforce
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The Supreme Court's treatment of Title VII has been mixed, with both
fairly liberal and fairly conservative interpretations, the latter of which
have sometimes provoked responses from Congress. Two ways of proving
discrimination under Title VII have developed: disparate treatment and
disparate impact. Disparate treatment involves a relatively straightforward
claim of intentional discrimination. It is unclear just what attitude the
Court has taken toward disparate treatment claims, whether it has made
such claims too difficult to prove, too easy to prove, or whether the Court
has gotten it pretty much right. The fact that there is uncertainty makes it
unlikely that the Court has gone to either extreme since then it would
212 Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994).
213 Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12117 (1994).
214 Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
215 10 U.S.C. § 654(b) (2000). This statute has been challenged as violating the equal protection
rights of homosexuals since it requires discharge from the military for the commission of homosexual
acts, However, the Second Circuit upheld the statute in Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628 (1998).
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probably be easy to characterize the Court's actions.
The uncertainty regarding disparate treatment claims under Title VII
centers around the interaction between burdens of persuasion and burdens
of production. A Title VII plaintiff bears the burden of "establishing a
prima facie case of [] discrimination" 6 (some claims are not "racial") by
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that he or she applied for a job
for which he or she was qualified and was rejected "under circufnstances
which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination."2 7 Once a
prima facie case is established, the burden is on the employer to produce
evidence that the plaintiff was rejected for a nondiscriminatory reason.2"'
If the employer meets this burden, then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to show that the employer's evidence was not the true reason for the
rejection.219
There has been uncertainty over exactly how this framework for proving discrimination affects the traditional burden of proof carried by plaintiffs in civil litigation. On some views, the Title VII framework was very
favorable to plaintiffs, because a prima facie case coupled with rebuttal of
the employer's nondiscriminatory reason would result in a victory. However, the Court always stated that the plaintiff bears "the burden of persuading the court that she has been the victim of intentional discrimination.""22 This makes Title VII look much more like any other category of
civil litigation, with no special advantage to plaintiffs.
In more recent cases, the Court has waffled on exactly what the plaintiff's burden is. In one case, the Court made it appear that trial courts
should direct verdicts against plaintiffs who fail to prove intentional discrimination even when they establish a prima facie case and prove that the
defendant's claimed reasons for the adverse action were pretextual.22 I
Later the Court backed off from that stance and held that a prima facie case
and proof that the employer's claimed reason was pretextual was sufficient
to create an issue for the jury on whether the defendant had discriminated
was
against the plaintiff.m The Court explained that its earlier holding
223
only that plaintiffs do not automatically win if they show pretext.
While it appears that the Court has by and large steered a middle
course on proof of discrimination generally, the Court appears to have
216 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
217 Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,253 (1981).
218 McDonnell Douglas,411 U.S. at 802.

219 Id. at 804.
220 Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
221 St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502,523-24 (1993).
222 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 146-47 (2000).
223 Id. at 146-49.
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acted very favorably toward plaintiffs in one area: harassment. The Court
has held that racial and sexual harassment can violate Title VII's prohibitions on discrimination, even when the employer does not take adverse
employment actions against the victim of harassment. 224 The Court has
extended this holding to sexual harassment against an employee of the
same gender as the harasser.225 Stated generally, sexual harassment that
does not result in adverse employment action violates Title VII if it results
in "an objectively hostile or abusive work environment. 2 6 The Court has
viewed itself as taking a "middle path" in these cases, not requiring tangible injury while also not prohibiting every instance of offensive conduct, 7
but I find the Court's doctrine fundamentally liberal, and certainly not required by the text of Title VII, in its acceptance of harassment claims without particular adverse employment actions beyond the existence of the hostile environment.
There are, however, plenty of examples in which the Court has not
been very receptive to the antidiscrimination goals of Title VII. For example, the Court has held that an employer's disability plan treating pregnancy different from other disabling medical conditions did not constitute
sex discrimination because men and women were treated identically with
regard to all other conditions. 8 In light of the fact that only women can
become pregnant, singling out pregnancy from among all disabling conditions for special treatment appears at least somewhat discriminatory. In
any event, this holding was reversed by Congress in the Pregnancy Disability Act, which requires that pregnancy be treated the same as other conditions causing a similar inability to work.229 This is just one of many instances in which Congress has overruled a restrictive Supreme Court decision concerning Title VII or another recent civil rights statute."
224 See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1993). While Harris was a case of
sexual harassment, the reasoning appears to apply equally to racially motivated harassment.
225 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998).
226 Harris,510 U.S. at 21.
227 Id.

228 Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 138 (1976). The Court had previously held that goveminent discrimination based on pregnancy did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484,497 (1974).
229 Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
230 Congress has overruled or limited several Supreme Court decisions regarding both recent and
Civil War-Era civil rights statutes. With regard to recent statutes, all of Congress's reactions have been
in response to Supreme Court decisions viewed as too restrictive of plaintiffs' rights. Many of the
statutory reactions to Supreme Court decisions regarding Reconstruction-Era statutes have also been to
limit or override decisions unfavorable toward plaintiffs. Examples include the amendments to § 1981
that were part of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 and the Civil Rights Attorneys Fees Act of 1976. Actions going the other way include Congress's reaction to Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522 (1984) (discussed supra note 136), and the statutes regulating prisoner suits over prison conditions, supranote 28.
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Another area of controversy within Title VII has been on the "disparate
impact" theory of proving discrimination. In what I consider a tremendously liberal decision, the Court decided that employment practices
adopted without discriminatory intent could nonetheless violate Title VII if
they have a disparate impact on protected groups.23 The Court's language,
surprising for an opinion by generally conservative Chief Justice Burger,
endorsed a very liberal theory of discrimination, under which "good intent
or absence of discriminatory intent does not redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as 'built in headwinds' for minority groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability."232
The Court established a burden-shifting framework for disparate impact cases that was similar to the framework governing disparate treatment
claims. However, the Court was not very clear on exactly how the burden
shifting in this area is supposed to work in terms of whether disparate impact is a separate theory for finding discrimination or just another method
of proving discriminatory intent. In the well-known Wards Cove233 case,
the Court elaborated on the burden shifting in disparate impact cases. The
Court stated that the plaintiff's initial burden was to demonstrate that a
particular employment practice had a disparate racial impact.23 By requiring the plaintiff to identify a "particular" employment practice, the Court
rejected disparate impact claims based solely on a statistical disparity between the racial makeup of the labor pool and the racial makeup of the
employer's work force.23 The Court stated that if a particular employment
practice is shown to have a disparate impact, the burden shifts to the employer to introduce evidence of business justification for the employment
practice." Here's where the Court's reasoning became very messy. The
Court then stated that if the employer introduces evidence of business justification, then the plaintiff can attempt to disprove the claim of business
justification or show that a less discriminatory alternative exists for accomplishing the same business goal.23 7 However, the Court appeared to equate
disparate impact theory with disparate treatment theory, stating that the
plaintiff must "prove that it was 'because of such individual's race, color,'
etc. that he was denied a desired employment opportunity."23' 8 This language raises the question of whether disparate impact theory truly allowed
231 Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971).
232 Id.
233 Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
234 Id. at 656.
235 Id. at 651-55.

236 Id. at 658.
237 Id. at 658-60.
238 Id. at 660 (quoting Title V11, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1994)).
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proof of discrimination without proof of discriminatory intent, although at
the same time the Wards Cove Court did not explicitly reject disparate impact as a method of proving a violation of Title VII.
Wards Cove was one of a group of Supreme Court decisions that Congress overruled in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,239 including several from
the same term of the Court as Wards Cove. However, the Court's decision
in Wards Cove was treated relatively moderately by Congress, perhaps
because of President Bush's threat to veto the 1991 Act, as he had done to
the 1990 version of the legislation. Congress overruled the Court's decision in Wards Cove insofar as it placed the burden of persuasion of lack of
business justification on the plaintiff. Under the 1991 Act, the employer
bears the burden of persuading the fact finder that the employment practice
that has a disparate impact is business justified.240 However, Congress did
not reject the Court's holding that the plaintiff must identify a particular
employment practice that has a disparate impact. In fact, Congress basically codified that holding24' with some qualifications, perhaps because
allowing proof of discrimination based on statistical disparities between the
labor force and the particular workplace was viewed as requiring employers to institute quotas, which had been the stated basis of President Bush's
veto of the 1990 Act.242
More striking perhaps than any particular decision, except perhaps for
the Court's very restrictive holding that discriminatory breach does not
violate § 1981,243 was the appearance of hostility on the Court toward the
remedial purposes of Title VII. In addition to the disparate impact claim in
Wards Cove, plaintiffs lost on a variety of issues, ranging from extraterritorial application of Title VII, 2' the statute of limitations for challenging an
allegedly discriminatory seniority system in a collective bargaining agreement,245 the standards of proof in a "mixed motive" case 246 and whether
239 Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
240 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (1994),
241 Id.
242 The statute did allow for proof of disparate impact based on the totality of the employer's
practices if "the elements of a respondent's decisionmaking process are not capable of separation for
analysis." Id. at § 2000e-2(k)(l)(B)(i). This essentially codified the Supreme Court's decision in
Dothardv. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977), with which Wards Cove appeared inconsistent.
243 Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 181-82 (1989).
244 EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,258-59 (1991).
245 Lorance v. AT&T Techs., Inc., 490 U.S. 900, 911-13 (1989).
246 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989). This case, perhaps better than any other,
shows how much more liberal Congress has been than the Court on civil rights matters. In Price Waterhouse, the Court, in a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan, held that an employer could avoid liability by establishing that the same adverse employment decision would have been made even if the
employer had not taken an impermissible factor into account. Id. at 242. This holding provoked a
dissent from Justice Kennedy in which he argued that a standard of "but for" causation was more con-
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courts could award interest on attorneys' fees in cases against the United
States government. 247 These decisions created a very strong impression
that the Court was hostile toward Title VII's purposes and was not shy
about using its power to limit Title VII's reach.
Comparing a pair of the Court's 1989 decisions illustrates why the
Court's restrictive rulings appeared so politically slanted against Title VII
plaintiffs from historically disadvantaged groups. In one of the cases addressed by the Civil Rights Act of 1991, the Court decided that female employees should have challenged the seniority system in their collective bargaining agreement when it was adopted, rather than waiting until it was
applied to them.248 The Court held that Title VII's 300 day statute of limitations began to run when the agreement was adopted, which was long
before the seniority provision was applied to the plaintiffs in the case.249 In
another decision which Congress also rejected in the Civil Rights Act of
1991, the Court held that White firefighters were free to challenge as discriminatory the application of a consent decree years after the decree was
adopted even though they had notice of the earlier litigation and could have
intervened to protect their interests.'
The consent decree was the result of
litigation alleging discrimination against Blacks in the City of Birmingham
fire department's employment practices. Thus, the Court's ruling in favor
of the plaintiffs was not a victory for civil rights but a challenge to the ability to use Title VII to combat discrimination against Blacks. While these
two decisions may not be doctrinally inconsistent, it appears that the Court
was much more understanding of the delay by the White firefighters challenging affirmative action than it was of the delay by the women challenging an allegedly discriminatory seniority system.
There are other instances in which Congress has overruled restrictive
Supreme Court decisions on the scope or meaning of recent civil rights
legislation. A prominent example involves the common requirement of
federal law that recipients of federal subsidies refrain from discriminating
on the basis of characteristics such as race and sex. In a case alleging discrimination at a college at which students used federal financial aid, the
Court limited the effectiveness of the nondiscrimination requirement, holdsistent the statutory language. Id. at 281-84. Congress, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991, enacted a
standard even more liberal than that of the plurality, under which an employer is liable whenever an
impermissible factor was "a motivating factor" in the employer's action. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(1994). Here, Congress rejected a decision by the more liberal group on the Court as too restrictive on
plaintiffs' rights under Title VII.
247 Library of Cong. v. Shaw, 478 U.S. 310,318-20 (1986).
248 Lorance, 490 U.S. at 911-12.
249 One can speculate on whether a suit at the time of adoption would have been rejected as pre.
mature.
250 Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755,761-69 (1989).
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ing that the prohibition on discrimination applied only to the particular
department or program receiving the federal funds."' Congress overruled
this holding in the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987 which extended
coverage of the prohibition against discrimination to the entire institu2 52
tion.
The Court continues, in many instances, to interpret recent civil right
statutes narrowly. There has been a great deal of controversy, for example,
over the Court's recent interpretations of the Americans with Disabilities
Act's definition of disability. Under the Act, a person is disabled if he or
she suffers from, has suffered from or is regarded as suffering from "a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the
major life activities of such individual."2 53 The Court first held that asymptomatic HIV infection is a disability since it limits the major life activity of
reproduction. 5 4 In three subsequent cases, however, the Court was not so
generous to disability plaintiffs, holding in all three cases that if a person's
impairment is correctable, for example by eyeglasses for vision problems
or medication for high blood pressure, the person is not disabled.2 5 According to the Court, only conditions that are not easily correctable actually
25 6
limit major life activities, thus meeting the definition of "disability.
Of course, looking primarily at cases in which plaintiffs have lost or in
which Congress has overruled the Court is guaranteed to make the Court
appear to be more restrictive on civil rights than it actually is. There are
numerous civil rights statutes that I have not mentioned, and many situations in which plaintiffs have been victorious where alternatives favoring
defendants were imaginable. There are also many instances of restrictive
rulings in which Congress has not overruled the Court, both with regard to
older statutes, such as §§ 1983 and 1985(3) and more recent ones. However, I do not think it is inaccurate to conclude that overall the Court continues to be more conservative than Congress on civil rights, and applies
statutory construction as a tool for combating Congress's civil rights
251 Grove City Coll. v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 570-74 (1984).
252 Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987, Pub L. No. 100-259, 102 Stat. 28 (1988) (codified in
scattered sections at 20 U.S.C.).
253 29 U.S.C. § 705(9) (1994).
254 Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 637-38 (1998).
255 Sutton v. United Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489-94 (1999) (holding that myopic persons
with correctable vision not disabled); Mutphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 523-25 (1999)
(holding that person with high blood pressure not disabled); Albertson's, Inc. v. Kirkingburg, 527 U.S.
555, 576-78 (1999) (holding that person with monocular vision not necessarily disabled; employer's
compliance with federal regulations justifies employer's employment practice).
256 In its most recent disability case, the Court was more liberal toward the plaintiff, holding that
a disabled professional golfer was entitled to use a golf cart in professional tournaments as an accommodation of his disability, even though the rules prohibited carts in the tournaments at issue. PGA
Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661 (2001).
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agenda. At a minimum, the record of congressional reactions to Supreme
Court decisions shows that the Court is more conservativ6 than Congress
on recent civil rights statutes, since with regard to these, Congress has
overruled only Court decisions unfavorable to plaintiffs in historically disadvantaged groups.
B. JudicialResistance to CongressionalPowerBeyond Race Discrimination
The most significant assertion ofjudicial power over recent civil rights
legislation has not been in statutory construction, but rather has involved
the Court wielding its power of judicial review to strike down civil rights
legislation or at least to limit the remedies available against governmental
defendants under civil rights statutes, mainly statutes not involving race or
gender discrimination. In essence, the Court has reverted to the standard it
used in 1883 to strike down the Civil Rights Act of 1875, and is now denying Congress the power to expand civil rights beyond those virtually entailed in constitutional provisions.
The most notable example here is the Court's decision that Congress
exceeded its power when it passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA").2 7 The now-familiar story of RFRA began with the Supreme
Court's decision that the Free Exercise Clause did not require an exemption from state drug laws for religious use of peyote. 25 ' The Court held that
challenges to facially neutral state laws that in effect infringed on religious
freedom were not subject to the compelling interest test but rather would be
upheld if they were facially neutral toward religion.259 This decision was
widely perceived as a threat to religious liberty, and Congress reacted by
passing RFRA, which purported to "restore the compelling interest test" to
protect "persons whose religious exercise is substantially burdened by govemment.'2W Congress relied on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
passing RFRA, but because RFRA granted rights beyond those recognized
in Supreme Court decisions, the statute raised serious questions about
Congress's power to define the rights enforceable under Section 5.
In City of Boerne v. Flores,261 the Court held that Congress lacked the
power to pass RFRA because RFRA went substantially beyond remedying
Fourteenth Amendment violations.262 The Court explicitly relied on the
Civil Rights Cases for its conclusion that Section 5 does not grant Congress
257 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993,42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
258 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
259 Id. at 886-89.

2042 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
261 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507,536 (1997).
262 Id. at 524-25.
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plenary power to legislate fights where no Fourteenth Amendment violations are present.263 This marks a reassertion of judicial power against
congressional attempts to expand rights, since, as the Court acknowledged,
language in an important earlier decision "could be interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the fights
contained in [Section] 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment." 6 The Court now
insists that legislation passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment is valid only if there is "a congruence between the means used
and the ends to be achieved"265 in terms of actual constitutional violations.
Further, the remedy prescribed must not be out of proportion to the extent
of constitutional violations.266
The Court's understanding of Congress's power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment has gone through three stages. First, in the nineteenth
century, the Court strictly required the Congress legislate only to remedy
actual constitutional violations. The Court distinguished the Section 5 enforcement power from other areas in which Congress is "clothed with direct and plenary powers of legislation over the whole subject." 67 The second stage occurred during the civil rights movement of the middle to late
twentieth century when the Court applied the same test for judging civil
rights legislation enforcing the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments as
it did to legislation in areas over which Congress had plenary power, the
necessary and proper minimal rationality standard.268 In essence, the Court
rejected the nineteenth century distinction between the enforcement power
and plenary powers. The third stage, which began with the Court's invalidation of RFRA, returns to a standard much closer to the nineteenth century view, sharply distinguishes between the enforcement power and other,
plenary powers, and virtually prohibits Congress from expanding rights
under the Fourteenth Amendment.269
263 Id. at 525 (quoting The Civil Rights Cases, 103 U.S. 3, 13-14 (1883)).
The Enforcement Clause, the Court said, did not authorize Congress to pass "general legislation upon the rights of the citizens, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and
which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or enforcing..
Id.

26 4

Id.
at 527-28 (discussing Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)).
265 Id. at 530.
266 Id. at 532.
267 The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 19.
268 See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651-52; Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409,439 (1968).
269 See Boerne, 521 U.S. at 534-36; United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 617-18 (2000) (rejecting Commerce Clause and Fourteenth Amendment as bases for authority to enact the Violence
Against Women Act). As noted above, in response to Boerne, Congress passed a new version of RFRA
under its Spending Clause and Commerce Clause powers. See supra note 54. In my view, when this
new statute reaches the Supreme Court, the Court is likely to reevaluate its spending clause jurisprudence and place new restrictions on Congress's power to condition the receipt of federal funds on

2002]

CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION

Recent civil rights legislation that addresses private discrimination is
not affected by the Court's restrictions on Congress's power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment because such legislation is passed pursuant to the
Commerce Clause, not the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment. As long
as the activity regulated affects interstate commerce, under the relatively
lenient contemporary standards for making that judgment, Congress has
plenary power to legislate against discrimination of various types.
However, when Congress attempts to make states liable for violations
of federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Court insists that Congress meet
the standards for enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the
more lenient standard applied to legislation over which Congress has plenary power. The reason that Fourteenth Amendment power is necessary is
that states have sovereign immunity from liability unless Congress acts
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment."' The Court held in the 1970s
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment grants Congress the power to
make states liable for Title VII violations.2 ' Because Title VII addresses
mainly race and sex discrimination, two forms of discrimination that are
likely to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress has the power to
make states liable for Title VII violations. In current doctrinal terms, there
is congruence and proportionality between Title VII's remedial provisions
and unconstitutional race and sex discrimination by states.
However, in a series of recent decisions, the Court has held unconstitutional congressional efforts to make states liable for age discrimination,
disability discrimination, patent infringement and violations of fair labor
standards.272 In all of these cases, the Court concluded that since there was
no record of constitutional violations by the state in those areas, Congress
lacked the power to make the states liable for violating the various statutes.
In doctrinal terms, there was no congruence or proportionality between
state constitutional violations and the remedies Congress prescribed.
In rejecting congressional efforts to expand protections of religious liberty and to make states liable for various forms of discrimination and other
illegal conduct, the Court has strongly asserted its power to confine Congress's ability to legislate civil rights. The Court may view legislation barcompliance with statutes that Congress would otherwise not have the power to enact. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,206-209 (1987).
270 The Court had allowed for overriding state sovereign immunity under the Commerce Clause
in Pennsylvaniav. Union Co., 491 U.S. 1, 5 (1989), but then overruled this decision in Seminole Tribe
v. Florida,517 U.S. 44,47 (1996).
271 See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445,447-48 (1976).
272 Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 373-74 (2001) (disability discrimination); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 91-92 (2000) (age discrimination); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758-60 (1999) (age discrimination); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627,647-48 (1999) (patent infringement).
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ring discrimination based on age or disability as far afield from the concerns addressed in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments and as unwise legislation imposing unjustified costs on employers, whether governmental or private. The Court may not view these as civil rights issues,
much as the nineteenth century Court did not view public accommodations
as a civil rights issue, but rather as a matter of social rights that should be
beyond Congress's reach. Perhaps 100 years from now history will view
the Court's narrowness as just as anachronistic as many now view the nineteenth-century Court's attitude toward racial discrimination in public accommodations.
There is obviously a great deal more that can be said about the Court's
recent efforts to restrict Congress's power to make states liable in both civil
rights and non-civil rights areas. For present purposes, the important point
is that the Court's behavior does not seem much different from its actions
just after the Civil War, even though society's views on civil rights have
significantly evolved. What I find most puzzling, and have nothing to say
about, is what purpose the majority on the Court is pursuing with its sovereign immunity doctrines. Is there a group or institution that needs legal
protection because it cannot achieve sufficient protection through the political process? Has Congress acted so invidiously, or so unwisely, that
Court action is justified? Has congressional action threatened the nature of
our governmental system or some feature that is so central that it must be
preserved against the repeatedly expressed will of the more democratic
branches of government? That there is no suggestion in the Court's decisions that provides anything close to an adequate answer to these questions
should raise considerable doubts concerning the propriety of the Court's
efforts.
Another area in which the Court's aggressive action appears to some to
be a threat to civil rights is in the Court's strict attitude toward racial preferences. In 1980, the Supreme Court upheld a federal law that required
recipients of federal public works grants to hire minority owned contractors
for at least ten percent of the monetary value of the grants.273 Then, in
1989, the Court rejected a similar local law, holding that minority setasides by local governments violated equal protection unless they were
established in response to specific evidence of past discrimination by the
particular governmental unit. 4 The Court rejected the idea that racial
classifications, when used in favor of disadvantaged minorities in affirmative action programs, are consistent with the purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As Justice O'Connor explained in a part of her opinion that
was not joined by a majority of the Court:
273 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448,453,490-92 (1980).
274 City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 476-77, 511 (1989).
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The mere recitation of a benign or compensatory purpose for the
use of a racial classification would essentially entitle the States to
exercise the full power of Congress under [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and insulate any racial classification from judicial scrutiny under [Section] 1. We believe that such a result would
be contrary to the intentions of the Framers of the Fourteenth
Amendment, who desired to place clear limits on the States' use of
race as a criterion for legislative action, and to have the federal
courts enforce those limitations. 2 5
The Court's decision against local set-aside programs signaled the beginning of the end for federal set-aside programs. In 1995, just fifteen
years after approving such programs, the Court reversed itself and held that
federal minority set-aside programs were subject to the same strict scrutiny
as state and local set-aside programs. 6 The Court explicitly disavowed its
1980 decision applying a more lenient standard of scrutiny to such pro2
grams-.v
The Court's return to strict scrutiny for all racial classifications, even
those in affirmative action programs, is a major setback for civil rights
advocates who, for a variety of reasons, have favored affirmative action
programs as the best method for overcoming the effects of past and current
discrimination. This jurisprudence has hit close to home for the legal
academy, where affirmative action admissions policies at state law schools
have been successfully challenged. 78 In my view, the Court's aggressive
application of color blind equal protection jurisprudence is likely to further
the ability of state and local government officials to engage in racial discrimination. Without affirmative action requirements with either, dare I
say, quotas or at least targets, it is very easy to explain racial disparities in
275 Id. at 490-91 (O'Connor, J.). The Court has also been very liberal in granting standing to

White contractors seeking to challenge such programs. In Northeastern Florida Chapter of Associated
General Contractorsof America v. City ofJacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 658, 663, 668-69 (1993), the

Court granted standing to White contractors to challenge a set-aside program even though they did not
allege that they had lost any contracts to minorities because of the set-aside program. Normally, this
would doom their case based on lack of injury sufficient for standing. However, the Court held that
they were injured because the statute prevented them from competing for contracts on an equal basis
with minorities. Id. at 669.
276 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 224 (1995). The Court rejected a more lenient standard of scrutiny for racial classifications in affirmative action, stating that "any person, of
whatever race, has the right to demand that any governmental actor subject to the Constitution justify
any racial classification subjecting that person to unequal treatment under the strictest judicial scrutiny." Id.
277 See id. at 235 ("Of course, it follows that to the extent (if any) that Fullilove held federal racial classifications to be subject to a less rigorous standard, it is no longer controlling.").
278 See. e.g., Hopwood v. Texas, 236 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2000) (challenging the University
of
Texas Law School's affirmative action admissions policies), cert. denied, 121 S. Ct. 2550 (2001).
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workforces and student bodies as a result of merit-based systems rather
than discrimination. 9
III. CONCLUSION

I conclude by restating the question with which I began-has the Court
moved beyond the obstructionist position that Professor Gressman observed fifty years ago, or is the history of civil rights legislation still an
unhappy one, with an activist Supreme Court frustrating Congress's efforts
to protect and expand civil rights? On issues of statutory construction involving civil rights legislation, the record appears mixed, with the Court
generally somewhere between the outright hostility that Professor Gressman termed "strict constructionism" and a complete embrace of the words
and aims of the Congresses that passed the various civil rights statutes.
When combined with the massive expansion in constitutional rights created
by the Court over the past half-century, the prospects for civil rights litigation are certainly much more favorable today than they were when Professor Gressman wrote in 1952.
Despite the fact that the conditions are much more favorable for civil
rights litigation today than they were fifty years ago, in my view the degree
of anti-civil rights judicial activism at the Supreme Court is still much too
high. By and large, the Court has obstructed Congress and stood against
efforts to legislatively redistribute power from the advantaged to the disadvantaged. If you start from the premise that Congress's legislative power
is a legitimate aspect of our system of government, then the best evidence
of the Court's unjustifiable obstructionism is the frequency with which
Congress has found it necessary to legislatively overrule restrictive Court
decisions. All too often, the Court forces Congress to react to its decisions
by making clear what many thought was already implicit, if not explicit, in
the text of its statutes. The Court is currently engaged in its most aggressive assertion of power to obstruct Congress in the civil rights area since
Reconstruction with its decisions imposing a stringent standard of review
on legislation passed under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Given that there is no suggestion in any of the Court's opinions that it is
protecting a disadvantaged group that is incapable of protecting itself po279 Consider an example recounted in Mark Tushnet's biography of Justice Marshall.
One of the
NAACP's early tactics in the fight against school segregation was to represent Black teachers who
were paid less than their White colleagues in suits for equal pay under the "separate but equal" understanding of equal protection. In some localities, once equal pay became required, the localities
switched from explicitly race based pay scales to subjective merit-based systems for setting teacher
salaries, and Black teachers continued to be paid significantly less than their White colleagues. See
TUSHNET, supra note 35, at 120. Only an affirmative action program is likely to be able to prevent the
perpetuation of discrimination through manipulation of subjective standards.
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litically or that some sinister motivation underlies Congress's actions, there
is reason to doubt that the role the Court has assumed in civil rights is an
appropriate one for a court in one of the most democratic countries in the
history of the planet, the last presidential election notwithstanding.

